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INVERTING THE VOID:  
 
A COMPARISON OF AL-GHAZĀLĪ AND DESCARTES 
 
KAMAL-EDIN KHASHOGGI 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
In this thesis, I compare the intellectual trajectories of René Descartes (c. 1596 – 
1650) and Abū-Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (c. 1058 – 1111).  
In Part I, I begin by considering their initial skeptical phases, where the two 
thinkers are at their most similar, philosophically, methodologically and narratively. I 
argue that while they begin their projects almost identically, especially in their methods 
and course of argument, they nonetheless differ in crucial respects. I locate the principal 
difference to be in their particular uses of the dream. While al-Ghazālī uses the dream to 
doubt reason itself, Descartes uses it merely to doubt sense-perception and particulars. I 
analyze this difference by drawing distinctions between dream consciousness and waking 
consciousness, local and global states of illusion, and which position in time each thinker 
argues from. I conclude Part I by showing how, despite arriving at the same formal, 
global skeptical conclusion, our two philosophers nonetheless arrive at it in 
characteristically different ways. 
In Part II, I consider how the two thinkers attempt to defeat skepticism. I pay 
particular attention to their epistemological, phenomenological and metaphysical claims, 
and their negotiations between reason, experience and the supra-rational. In virtue of 
	   vi 
comparing their parallel journeys out of skepticism’s void, I am able to argue that the 
substantive content of their skeptical phases is integral to their positive conclusions. I 
show that their positive conclusions are direct inversions of those early skeptical 
structures. More generally, I argue that skepticism –– to its own demise –– is never 
empty of content.  
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Preface on Methodology, Narrative and History 
 
Preliminary or superficial comparisons of al-Ghazālī and Descartes shall prove 
quite disparate, depending on one’s starting point of observation. If we begin by looking 
at their conclusions and their finished, articulated programs, we shall say there is a wide 
gulf between them. However, if we begin from the first premises, from their early 
skeptical phases and methods, we shall say they appear nearly identical. The view from 
above suggests friction between Descartes’ rationalism and al-Ghazālī’s mysticism, a 
diametrically opposed approach to epistemology and metaphysics. The view from below 
suggests a kindred quest to invert the absolute doubt of skepticism in service of absolute 
certainty in reason, God and the intelligibility of the world, by means of the same 
method.  
But in order to move past a superficial comparison and make sense of this 
disparity, it shall be necessary to establish a few methodological principles. Fortunately, 
such methodological principles are afforded to us by the narrative quality of the two 
works that shall anchor this investigation: The Meditations on First Philosophy and the 
munqidh min al-dalal [Deliverance From Error]. Both of these works present arguments 
in narrative, autobiographical contexts. In the Preface to the Meditations, Descartes asks 
us to “meditate seriously with him.”1 Al-Ghazālī, likewise, implicitly asks us to follow 
along as he recounts his intellectual autobiography.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 CSM II, 8 
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Both thinkers invite us into the subjectivity of their thought, to a representation of 
how that thought came to be in the lived experience of the author, rather than as a set of 
demonstrative arguments pulled out of time. The narrative style calls us to place 
ourselves in the place of the I, so that we may thereby follow this I from its beginnings, to 
its decisive conclusions. 
Their styles suggest that their works are meant to be instructional and 
performative, as well as demonstrative. Understanding this provides a hermeneutic key to 
both texts: it insists on considering the dialectical trajectory of the thoughts as they 
present themselves. It should be noted, even at this stage, that there are some differences 
between the two thinkers. Whereas both begin in similar fashion – the disembodied 
author narrating the dialectic of his thoughts – it becomes clear soon enough that al-
Ghazālī’s munqidh is far more autobiographical and personal than Descartes’ 
Meditations. In any case, I propose to interpret the texts on their own terms and make our 
comparison by following along the narrative track of each work. While I shall consult 
and incorporate other texts by the authors and secondary literature where necessary, I 
shall follow the course of the Meditations and the munqidh for the most part. 
The reader may wonder whether I shall be exploring the historical question of 
whether al-Ghazālī influenced Descartes. I shall not take up this question whatsoever as 
part of my investigation. Mine is primarily a philosophical and not a historical 
investigation. Briefly, however, M. M. Sharif2 has suggested that while there is no 
evidence of a Latin translation of the munqidh min al-dalal having existed during 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Sharif, 2: 1381-4 
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Descartes’ time, the textual parallels are great enough to demand further historical work 
in this area. Tad Schmaltz, in Descartes on Causation,3 further outlines the ways in 
which al-Ghazālī anticipates Cartesian occasionalism, more fully developed and 
articulated by Nicolas Malebranche. But, of course, anticipation is not the same as 
influence. As a final, purely speculative note on this historical question, I would say it is 
likely that al-Ghazālī mediately influenced Descartes through the prism of late 
scholasticism; as to whether Descartes actually read al-Ghazālī, I remain without 
answers. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Schmaltz, 12-15 
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1 
Part I: Dreaming the World Away 
 
1. Introduction to Part I 
 
A cursory, side-by-side reading of al-Ghazālī’s munqidh min al-dalal and 
Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy should inspire surprise in any reader at the 
near identical structure and content of their opening moments. Both thinkers upheave the 
scholastic and Greek traditions by insisting on the priority of epistemology over 
metaphysics. Their revised approaches to philosophy thus begin with a quest to determine 
(1) how we can know what we know, (2) what the limits of knowledge and reason are, 
and, thereby, (3) what counts as certain knowledge, prior to making any knowledge 
claims. Aside from these initial revolutionary ambitions, we are also treated to an 
immediate grounding of philosophy in subjectivity, as both thinkers proceed by way of 
autobiographical narrative.  
As al-Ghazālī and Descartes begin their investigations, the reader should be 
further surprised at the same method of radical doubt they use to inaugurate their 
projects, and at the seemingly identical dream arguments they immediately resort to. Yet, 
as I shall argue, they are not exactly identical. It is my aim to show precisely how they 
differ, and to show why this difference matters both in terms of their subsequent 
intellectual trajectories, and in terms of the more general status of skepticism in 
philosophy.  
  
	   
2 
2. Motivations 
 
It will be useful to preliminarily consider the motivations of Al-Ghazālī and 
Descartes as they embark on their epistemological quests. For now, I shall restrict myself 
to discussing only the motivations declared by the authors themselves.  
Descartes, in his dedicatory letter to the Sorbonne, declares that he seeks to prove 
the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. In the same letter, he also addresses 
the need to resolve “difficulties in the sciences.”4 This generally seems to refer to 
resolving the tensions between religion and science, or, more specifically, reason and 
revelation, 5 which was contemporarily enflamed by the Church’s episode with Galileo. It 
is also aimed at grounding the sciences upon certain principles. In the opening section of 
the First Meditation, Descartes also recounts his own longstanding desire to directly 
address “the large number of falsehoods that I had accepted as true in my childhood, and 
by the highly doubtful nature of the whole edifice that I had subsequently based on 
them.” 6  
Al-Ghazālī, meanwhile, begins by telling us of his lifelong quest for “the real 
meaning of things,” which has motivated him to deeply scrutinize every available 
tradition from the inside.7  He also speaks about losing the dogmatism of inherited belief 
[taqlid]. In this passage,8 he contrasts taqlid9 with fitra,10 claiming that all people are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 CSM II, 4. 
5 One could even say problems with metaphysics. From a Kantian perspective, it seems Descartes is 
anticipating the impending humiliation of metaphysics. 
6 CSM II, 12. 
7 RJM, 18 -19. 
8 RJM, 19-20 
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endowed with fitra, but that it is the arbitrary taqlid of their parents which makes them 
Jewish, or Christian, or Muslim, or of any other particular faith. He thus intends to 
investigate the true meaning of originary fitra. This then leads him to consider knowledge 
itself, like Descartes, as a way to investigate the basic principles serving as its foundation. 
Autobiographically, this leads him to a skeptical crisis, where he claims to have become a 
“skeptic in fact, but not in utterance and doctrine.” As we shall see, this is the first of two 
crises for al-Ghazālī, the first being epistemological, and the second being spiritual.  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Inherited, dogmatic, conformist belief, usually in reference to religious belief one assents to on the mere 
authority of a cleric, parent or theologian. Al-Ghazālī does not use this term in a purely pejorative sense. 
Indeed, he thinks it is necessary in many respects, though he seems to find it contemptuous in regards to 
himself. 
10 The term fitra refers in this context to a human’s basic disposition towards loving (and therefore 
knowing) God, or his or her basic spiritual constitution.  
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3. Conditions for Certainty and A General Sketch of The Skeptical Phases 
 
Al-Ghazālī and Descartes both begin their works by espousing the same method 
of doubt as a way to find certainty.11 This method of doubt aims at determining whether a 
belief can be considered absolutely certain. On their view, a belief is certain if it is 
absolutely beyond doubt. Descartes describes an indubitable belief as being clear and 
distinct; al-Ghazālī describes it as being perfectly, manifestly clear [jali], and secure a 
priori.12 The method thus requires us to subject a belief to total epistemic scrutiny by 
inducing ourselves to doubt it as much as possible, from every conceivable angle. As 
both thinkers climb the epistemic ladder in this quest, they are left in a state of utter 
metaphysical skepticism, unable to claim any belief for certain. Let us see how they 
comparatively arrive at this position. 
 
The opening skeptical phases of both the munqidh and the Meditations have the 
same general, overarching structure and formal conclusions, though they are different in 
many subtle respects. Let us begin by first collapsing both arguments into one general 
form, before examining their more particular differences. 
 
The unified skeptical argument: 
 
(1) Only indubitable beliefs, which we perceive clearly and distinctly, 
constitute certain knowledge. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ilm al-yaqin, for al-Ghazālī. 
12 jali, which has the English sense of things that are perfectly clear and evident, or which are manifestly 
evident. McCarthy translates it as “perfectly clear.” As we shall see in Part II, manifestation is a critical 
Ghazālīan concept. 
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(2) Beliefs are derived of sense-experience or rational judgment. 
(3) Sense-experience can be doubted. 
(4) Reason and logically necessary, analytic propositions can be doubted. 
(5) Therefore, certain knowledge seems impossible. 
 
 
The justifications for (3) and (4) between Descartes and al-Ghazālī differ too 
much to be truly collapsed, however. Much of the difference, in this initial phase and 
beyond, surrounds the use of the dream as an epistemological device. How much doubt 
can the dream afford us? In what respects does the dream allow us to doubt? In order to 
address these and other questions, let us first reconstruct the particular skeptical 
arguments of each thinker.   
 
 
  
	   
6 
4. Perceptual Illusions 
  
Both Descartes and Al-Ghazālī begin by doubting their sense-experience.13 For 
al-Ghazālī, perceptual illusions and their mathematical foils are sufficient enough reason 
to doubt all of sense-experience. Unlike al-Ghazālī, Descartes is not satisfied with merely 
using perceptual illusions as a way to doubt all of sense-experience. He says, “Yet 
although the senses occasionally deceive us with respect to objects which are very small 
or in the distance, there are many other beliefs about which doubt is quite impossible, 
even though they are derived from the senses…”14 After brushing off the possibility of 
madness as a suitable reason to doubt these beliefs, he employs the dream argument to 
finish off sense-experience and knowledge of its particulars. 
 Descartes is understandably more wary about using perceptual illusions alone to 
doubt all of sense-experience, for of course just because some sense-perceptions are 
illusory, it does not follow that all sense-perceptions are therefore illusory. After all, it 
may not be due to a fault in the senses that a false belief is derived from sense-perception. 
We might be in poor lighting conditions, or looking at an object from a peculiar angle.   
 Is it the case, then, that al-Ghazālī is making too hasty an inference by suggesting 
that perceptual illusions are enough to doubt beliefs derived of sense-perception? 
Perhaps. But his more incisive point is not that some perceptual illusions alone 
undermine sense-perception, or that all sense-perceptions are therefore illusions. His 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The term al-Ghazālī uses it “hisayat.” McCarthy translates this as “sense-data,” but I think this might be 
anachronistic. “Sensations” is a more direct translation; “sense-experiences” carries the broadest 
translatable sense of the term in context. 
14 CSM II, 12-13. 
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point is that our beliefs derived from sense-perception are susceptible to rational 
authentication ‘from above,’ so to speak, and therefore categorically lack intrinsic 
security. As he says, “…the sense-judge makes its judgments, but the reason-judge 
refutes it and repeatedly gives the lie in an incontrovertible fashion. Then I said: ‘my 
reliance on sense-data has also become untenable.’”15 In other words, we cannot be 
certain that our sense-experiences are true, even if they are certain and true, without first 
appealing to reason to authenticate them. 
Whether or not this particular argument of his works, it is worth noting that his 
strategy here is one that shall pervade all of our investigation. His point is that 
consciousness of sense-experience cannot immanently secure itself in view of the 
possibility of being subordinated by rational judgment, and must therefore appeal to and 
cohere with reason over and above it in order to escape skepticism. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 RJM, 21-22 
	   
8 
5. The Dream Argument 
 
In this section, we shall examine the dream arguments al-Ghazālī and Descartes 
provide as reasons to doubt. The dream argument functions differently in the two 
arguments. Descartes uses it primarily to solidify his doubt in sense-experience, and al-
Ghazālī uses it primarily to doubt reason.  
Briefly wrought, the general dream argument, attributable to both thinkers,16 goes 
as follows: When you are dreaming, you do not and cannot17 know whether you are 
dreaming or awake. There are therefore no criteria by which to differentiate between 
dreaming and being awake while dreaming. If you were dreaming now, you could not 
know it. If you were dreaming now, and believed yourself to be awake, you would have 
no way to validate or falsify that belief. Beliefs derived of perceptions while dreaming do 
not count as knowledge about anything real, let alone certain knowledge. Therefore, your 
waking beliefs are dubitable, even if you think you are awake. 
The two thinkers stress different aspects of dreaming to make their points, 
however, and therefore draw different conclusions. Before delving into these differences, 
it shall be worth asking: in what ways are their uses of the dream similar? The answer is 
that both appeal to dream consciousness as a mode of consciousness that: (1) Is unaware 
of itself as such; (2) Lacks the immanent resources to want to or to be able to know itself 
as such; (3) Has illusions for its objects and beliefs; (4) By (1)-(3), is threatening to our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 CSM II, 13-14 in Descartes; RJM 21-23 in al-Ghazālī. 
17 The phenomenon of lucid dreaming might be a good counter here, especially to Descartes, and neither 
Descartes nor al-Ghazālī seem to regard it. However, I think it does not matter much for their general point. 
It seems for most people, most dreams and their ‘narratives’ are completely determined, do not afford much 
self-awareness to consciousness, and are outside of consciousness’ control.  
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confidence in waking consciousness and our waking beliefs. These similarities shall 
become more clear as we look at the differences between Descartes and al-Ghazālī. 
There are a number of different forks in the road to more fully comparing the two 
dream arguments. I will preliminarily assert that the two uses of the dream are not in 
conflict due to a disagreement about the quality of dreams. Rather, the difference occurs 
when the two thinkers select variable qualities of dreaming as evidence, and due to what 
position in time the thinker pictures for himself in reaching for the dream as a way to 
doubt. In other words, al-Ghazālī and Descartes are generally talking past each other. I 
will argue this point on three grounds: (1) On their different uses of the 
indistinguishability of the dream state from the waking state; (2) On what it is like to 
reason in a dream; (3) On how global and local states of illusion feature in their dream 
arguments. 
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5.1 Indistinguishability, Believable Absurdity, and Transcendence 
 
What is it like to dream? Does dreaming accurately simulate reality? Or perhaps it 
is more a confusing heap of absurdities somehow given to our dreaming minds as 
coherent, indubious narratives.18 What kinds of dreams are there? What do dreams look 
like from the position of dream consciousness, and what do they look like from the 
position of waking consciousness? What is the relation of dream consciousness to waking 
consciousness?19 All of these questions are pertinent to our investigation, for different 
answers are implied and utilized by Descartes and al-Ghazālī. In this section, I shall argue 
that they emphasize different phenomenological aspects of dreaming to derive different 
conclusions.  
 
Let us start with Descartes. As we have already noted, Descartes is not satisfied 
with perceptual illusions as a reason to doubt all beliefs derived of sense-perception, so 
he employs the dream argument, which he finds sufficient to categorically dismiss (1) 
sense-perception and (2) knowledge of particulars as certain knowledge.  
Descartes’ dream argument asks us to think about what it is like to dream while 
we are having realistic dreams. By realistic dreams, I mean dreams that simulate waking 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Perhaps I am speaking only for myself, here, but it seems to me that dreams usually feature 
consciousness as more of an observer to an unfolding, determined kind of narrative that is generated by the 
mind, even if consciousness plays a role in that narrative (as an ‘actor,’ if you will). Dream consciousness 
seems to me characteristically unlike lived experience in this regard, in that it is severely deficient in self-
awareness and also in the kind of reflective feeling of free will we experience (whether or not we are in fact 
free). While we are not interested in verifying the soundness of the arguments in this paper, my view might 
serve as an argument against Descartes’ argument from dreaming. 
19 Again, while both seem to share the same self, they seem characteristically different. 
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reality both in terms of their content and in terms of their believability. In the First 
Meditation, Descartes tells us: “How often, asleep at night, am I convinced of just such 
familiar events – that I am here in my dressing-gown, sitting by the fire – when in fact I 
am lying undressed in bed!” 20 
These are the kinds of dreams that, after a while, might sneak into the bank of 
memories we take to be veridical. Was I really sitting by the fire that day, or was it a 
dream? Did I really speak to her on the phone about our appointment last Monday? 
Surely, after I dream of a chimera riding a bicycle, I will not entertain such questions. 
Descartes’ argument thus points to the indistinguishability between realistic dream states 
and the waking state. Furthermore, Descartes asks us to consider this phenomenon from 
the position of dream consciousness, wherein we are automatically convinced of our 
realistic dream-perceptions, and wherein it is most evident that “…there are never any 
sure signs by means of which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep.”21  
While Descartes does also refer to more outlandish dreams, such as dreams of 
satyrs or sirens, or generally having “the same experiences while asleep as madmen do 
when awake,”22 these are not the emphasis. The emphasis is precisely on those dreams 
that most heighten the sense of indistinguishability from the position of dream 
consciousness. A dream consisting of believable, realistic particulars shall only add to the 
quality of indistinguishability. Descartes’ use of absurd dreams more particularly regards 
his theory of simples and universals, which we shall look at in the next section. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 CSM II, 13 
21 CSM II, 13 
22 CSM II, 13 
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There are two possible outcomes for Descartes’ version of the dream argument. 
The weaker outcome (1) is that each one of our experiences is individually dubitable. We 
can conclude that since there is no way to ensure that we are not dreaming, each 
experience could be a figment of dream consciousness.  
The stronger claim (2), given (1), is that we can never verify that we are sensing 
something external from us since we have no way to verify whether our senses are real. 
Our senses themselves could be illusions and, as such, they epistemically undermine 
themselves, since we can only know we have senses by means of our senses. On this 
stronger claim, we have no justification in believing in the external world or in our 
experiences whatsoever, since the impossibility of distinguishing illusory states from 
waking states makes it possible that we are always dreaming, or that there is no knowable 
transcendent “waking state.” In short, claim (2) is that all our experiences might be 
dreams, for we have to know that we are not dreaming in order to know anything about 
the external world. Since we cannot know that we are not dreaming, all our experiences 
might be dreams. 
The support for this stronger claim can be found in the Sixth Meditation, where 
Descartes says:  
“[E]very sensory experience I have ever thought I was having while awake I can 
also think of myself as sometimes having while asleep; and since I do not believe that 
what I seem to perceive in sleep comes from things located outside me, I do not see why I 
should be any more inclined to believe this of what I think I perceive while awake.”23 
(Italics mine).  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 CSM II, 53 
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Now, Descartes nonetheless thinks dreams cannot undermine our knowledge of 
the “simpler and more universal things,”24 or reason itself. We shall see why in the next 
section. For now, let us turn to al-Ghazālī. 
 
Since al-Ghazālī thinks he has already sufficiently doubted sense-experience, his 
use of the dream shall be quite different. Al-Ghazālī intends to show how dreams 
undermine reason itself. 
Descartes’ argument hinges on the fact that some dreams are indistinguishable 
from waking life, when considered from the position of dream consciousness. 
Meanwhile, al-Ghazālī’s argument hinges on the fact that some dreams are clearly 
distinguishable from waking life, when considered from the position of waking 
consciousness.  
 Once we awake from our dreams and recall them, says al-Ghazālī, we should be 
baffled at our gullible and unreliable dream consciousness for having unsuspectingly 
derived any beliefs from its absurd objects. As he says, “Don’t you see that when you are 
asleep you believe certain things and imagine certain circumstances and believe they are 
fixed and lasting and entertain no doubts about that being their status? Then you wake up 
and know that all your imaginings and beliefs were groundless and unsubstantial.”25 
Al-Ghazālī’s point should be familiar to anyone who has woken up from a 
particularly strange dream. Unlike Descartes’ dream of sitting by the fire, al-Ghazālī is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 CSM II, 14 
25 RJM, 22 
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interested in the sharp contrast between the believability of chimeras on bicycles and the 
believability of waking reality. 
We should therefore note the epistemic unreliability of dream consciousness, such 
that it has a defective rational faculty, and such that it is subject to being subordinated by 
the judgments of rational, waking consciousness.  Both thinkers would agree that there is 
no way to differentiate between the dream state and waking life while a dream is 
ongoing, but al-Ghazālī emphasizes that there is a clear qualitative difference once we are 
back in the waking state. In other words, the dream state is only indistinguishable from 
waking life to dream consciousness. To waking consciousness, it is easy to differentiate 
between a dream and waking reality. It is especially easy to contrast waking reality from 
dreams of clearly senseless absurdities. 
One might think that this conclusion would weaken the skeptical argument. But 
interestingly, it only increases the power of skepticism for al-Ghazālī. For, if 
distinguishability between states of consciousness is only possible from a transcendent 
position,26 what does this say about the waking state? It says that even if what we take to 
be the waking state truly were the waking state,27 still we have no way to know if we are 
accessing absolute reality. For al-Ghazālī, the indistinguishability of the dream state from 
the waking state while dreaming, followed by its immediate distinguishability upon 
waking, exhibits an asymmetrical relation between two states of consciousness, which he 
thinks can be generalized. If the relation can be generalized, then it leaves rational, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 In this case, being in the waking state would be a transcendent position in relation to the dream state. 
27 That is, a state of consciousness which has more epistemic legitimacy than the dream state. Or, more 
accurately, a state of consciousness that is epistemically and metaphysically transcendent to another state of 
consciousness; e.g., waking consciousness is transcendent to dreaming consciousness. 
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waking consciousness open to being the subject of another such relation, but this time 
with its position reversed. 
If that is true, we thus could not know if we are accessing absolute reality because 
the possibility of a further transcendent state, whose relation to the waking state would be 
analogous to the relation between the dream state and the waking state, is now always 
open. Let us look at what al-Ghazālī specifically has to say on this matter: 
“So while everything you believe through sensation or intellection in your 
waking state may be true in relation to that state, what assurance have you that you may 
not suddenly experience a state which would have the same relation to your waking state 
as the latter has to your dreaming, and your waking state would be dreaming in relation to 
that new and further state? If you found yourself in such a state, you would be sure that 
all your rational beliefs were unsubstantial fancies.”28 
 
 
Whereas Descartes’ dream argument, even in its strongest form, merely suggests 
we could always be dreaming and have no way to verify being in the waking state, al-
Ghazālī’s argument denies the epistemic worth of the waking state qua waking state. 
When he identifies the epistemic superiority of waking consciousness over dream 
consciousness, he fixes on the relation between them and generalizes it. He sees that the 
general relation is instantiated once already; so why, he asks, can it not be instantiated 
again at a higher level? It is conceivable, and therefore possible, for it to be so 
instantiated. Therefore, waking consciousness, its faculties, and all of its objects are 
dubitable. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 RJM, 22-23. 
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What we can see from these initial comparisons is that both Descartes’ and al-
Ghazālī’s dream arguments deny us justification about particulars; however, al-Ghazālī’s 
denies universals, too, in virtue of denying the power of reason. But this is the beginning 
of a more serious split between the two thinkers. That is, the split between al-Ghazālī’s 
mysticism and Descartes’ rationalism. We shall consider universals more closely in the 
next section. I will also have more to say on the constitutive differences between al-
Ghazālī’s dreams and Descartes’, since it touches on a narrower point. For now it is 
sufficient to recognize the general differences.  
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5.2 The Status of Universals, Logical Necessities and Fundamentals in 
Dreams 
 
In this section, I will consider how the dream can be used to preserve universals in 
one case, as in Descartes’ account; and I will consider how it can be used to doubt 
universals in another case, as in al-Ghazālī’s account.  
 
We have already seen al-Ghazālī’s strategy for doubting universals, logically 
necessary analytic propositions [al-daruriyyat],29 and the intellect [al-aql].30 For him, 
they are only derivatively doubted, for his real target is reason itself. If reason is in doubt, 
so too are its objects. As we saw, the rational faculty is in doubt due to the possibility of a 
transcendent state of consciousness over and above it. This transcendent state of 
consciousness could: (1) feature a higher faculty than reason, which subordinates reason; 
(2) correspond to absolute reality. 
 
Meanwhile, even the strong reading of Descartes’ dream argument does not deny 
reason, universals, or logically necessary propositions. In order for Descartes to 
emphasize his argument, he shall now switch his focus from realistic dreams to more 
fantastical dreams. However, note that Descartes is still asking us to make our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The term al-Ghazālī uses is al-daruriyyat; literally: “the necessary things” or “the necessities.” 
30 The specific word he uses to refers to the cognitive faculty that fails us with regards to universals or 
necessary truths is “al-aql.” Generally this has the sense of the rational faculty, in this context. 
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considerations from the position of dream consciousness; he does not ask us to draw a 
contrast between it and waking consciousness, as al-Ghazālī does.  
On Descartes’ view, universals survive the dream argument. They survive the 
dream argument because the content of dreams is only possible in virtue of fundamental 
universals. Or, in other words, even the non-veridical experiences we have while 
dreaming are constituted of universals and ontological simples. In regards to this, 
Descartes says: 
 “…[T]he visions which come in sleep are like paintings, which may have been 
fashioned in the likeness of things that are real, and hence that at least these general kinds 
of things – eyes, head, hands and the body as a whole – are things which are not 
imaginary but are real and exist. For even when painters try to create sirens and satyrs 
with the most extraordinary bodies, they cannot give them natures which are new in all 
respects; they simply jumble up the limbs of different animals. Or if perhaps they manage 
to think up something so new that nothing remotely similar has ever been seen before – 
something which is therefore completely fictitious and unreal – at least the colours used 
in the composition must be real. By similar reasoning… it must be admitted that other 
even simpler and more universal things are real. These are as it were the real colours 
from which we form all the images of things, whether true or false, that occur in our 
thought.”31 
 
 In this passage, Descartes makes a few suggestions: (1) There are fundamental 
elements to all potential objects of experience, such as colours or quantities (we might 
call these mereological primitives);32 (2) These fundamental elements are universal and a 
priori;33 (3) The mind can generate new composites, but not new fundamental parts; (4) 
Dreams must import these simples and universals from absolute reality in order to have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 CSM II, 13. 
32 For a deeper look at Descartes’ mereological ontology, cf. MacDonald, esp. 100-5. 
33 He shall later call these innate concepts, of course. 
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any content at all; (5) The class of simples and universals is not contingent upon 
empirical reality.34 
No matter how freakish or absurd the particular composites that show up in our 
dreams end up being, universals and ontological simples nonetheless compose the fabric 
of dreams. Even absurdities depend on something for their existence, after all.  
But just what are these ontological simples?35 In the First Meditation, he says: 
“The class [of simples and universals] appears to include corporeal nature in general, and 
its extension; the shape of extended things; the quantity, or size and number of these 
things; the place in which they may exist, the time through which they endure, and so 
on.”36 
After asserting that the dream argument cannot damage universals or simples, 
Descartes then goes on to claim that arithmetic, geometry and other a priori, universal-
dependent disciplines cannot be doubted using the dream argument either. He claims that 
arithmetic and geometry (and presumably logic, too, though he does not name it) survive 
the dream argument, since they are dependent solely on universals and simples.37 “For 
whether I am awake or asleep,” Descartes says, “two and three added together are five, 
and a square has no more than four sides.”38 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Here Descartes seems to be committing himself to a kind of Platonism. 
35 In Rule Twelve of the Rules For the Direction of the Mind (CSM I, 43-5), Descartes goes into more 
details. There, he generally categorizes the simples as: indivisible, always intuited clearly and distinctly, 
intellectually and materially primitive in nature (e.g., quantity, existence, duration, etc.), self-evident, 
simply true, conjoinable, formal or material. Meanwhile, composites are formed by impulse, conjecture or 
deduction. 
36 CSM II, 14 
37 CSM II, 14. 
38 CSM II, 14. 
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There are two ways to interpret Descartes in this passage. One way would be to 
say that he thinks dream consciousness is rational enough to recognize the impossibility 
of denying logically necessary propositions. On this interpretation, it is impossible to 
deny a logically necessary proposition while dreaming. This view does not seem tenable. 
The other way would be to say that despite dream consciousness’ rational failures, the 
states of affairs affirmed by logically necessary propositions still hold nonetheless. 
Furthermore, insofar as those states of affairs are ontological simples, they serve as parts 
to the composites experienced in dreams. 
For example, one could easily imagine rejecting the proposition, “All triangles 
have three sides” while dreaming. One could also assert, “All triangles have four sides.” 
Irrespective of this rational failure, the fact remains that it is impossible to conceive of a 
four-sided triangle. No one shall ever dream of a four-sided triangle, though someone 
could simply make incorrect assertions about triangles, say, by calling a square a triangle, 
or by holding inconsistent beliefs about triangles, or by failing to recognize triangles 
correctly and calling them “guitars.”  
Furthermore, Descartes’ point is not that the geometrical content of a dream must 
exactly mirror that of real nature in its organization or cohesiveness. The point is that the 
simplest necessities, such as the law of non-contradiction, existence itself, or the three-
sidedness of triangles, cannot be rationally doubted due only to particular composite 
absurdities, which make use of those simple necessities. To give a more concrete 
example: the red balloon I dream of is not real, but redness must be, in virtue of the fact 
that I can dream of a red balloon at all. 
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How might al-Ghazālī respond to these powerful arguments? To use Descartes’ 
vocabulary, it doesn’t matter to al-Ghazālī if the simples keep their seeming necessity in 
the makeup of dreams; the fact that the intellect fails to discern the disconnect between 
rational simples and absurd composites is part of the trouble. Al-Ghazālī might 
presumably affirm that composites, absurdities and illusions are dependent on something, 
but he might insist that we cannot know what that something is. 
Further, he might say that simples can be dubitable if they fail to generate 
coherent composites, or generally attack Descartes’ theory of ontological fundamentality 
altogether. That we can be convinced of absurdities in dreams as if they were 
ontologically valid or epistemically valid, as if they had the same intuitive or epistemic 
force, is the point for al-Ghazālī. It greatly damages his trust in rationality, intellection or 
the general structures of consciousness that can seemingly shift without 
distinguishability. 
To conclude, it isn’t that universals don’t (initially, at least) have ontological 
status in dreams for al-Ghazālī – indeed, it seems difficult to imagine how they couldn’t – 
but that his skepticism about reason and intellection takes justification about universals 
down with it. And this is not merely the case for the dream state, but for the waking state 
too.  
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5.3 The Status of Reason in Dreams 
 
Al-Ghazālī focuses on the distinguishability between dreams and being awake, 
from the position of waking consciousness. As we saw, the phenomenological emphasis, 
for him, must therefore be on absurd dreams, for they are easier to contrast to waking life. 
Al-Ghazālī refers to these absurdities as “imaginings and beliefs,” which, upon waking 
up, are clearly “groundless and unsubstantial.”39 What is important to note is that al-
Ghazālī is contrasting dream consciousness against waking consciousness in general; 
comparing dreamed absurdities against regular phenomena is not his primary interest. 
In order to better understand his position, consider the following question: Are 
dreams by definition absurd, illusory, irrational or all three? Or, rather, are they only 
derivatively as such due to the dream consciousness that attends to them?  
It seems the content of dreams can be either rational or irrational,40 or a mix. We 
could dream of Descartes’ fireplace, or of the chimera on the bicycle. It makes no 
difference to dream consciousness, for dream consciousness shall readily accept both 
without suspicion [tshk]. Dream consciousness itself is therefore irrational in principle, 
for it has no criteria by which to differentiate between what is rational and what is not.  
Throughout his skeptical phase, al-Ghazālī targets rational consciousness in 
general. He seems to think that if rational consciousness itself can be doubted, so too can 
its objects or beliefs. If it is possible for consciousness to sink to such immanent irrational 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 RJM, 22 
40 We shall, later on in this paper, want to introduce the more neutral “non-rational,” but in this context it is 
important to stick to rational/irrational binary. 
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helplessness as dream consciousness does in relation to waking consciousness, then it is 
possible for rational consciousness to be helpless in relation to some further transcendent 
state.  
Al-Ghazālī thus arrives at his conclusion about reason by the following steps: 
Step 1: Note the indistinguishability of dreams from waking reality, from the 
position of dream consciousness.  
Step  2: Derive the general dream argument. 
Step 3: Note the distinguishability of dreams from waking reality, from the 
position of waking consciousness. 
Step 4: Derive the relation of subordination between waking consciousness and 
dream consciousness. 
Step 5: Generalize the relation of subordination between states of consciousness. 
Step 6: Derive the possibility of instantiating the general relation again, this time 
with rational, waking consciousness in the subordinate position. 
 
Interestingly, unlike the function of dreams for al-Ghazālī, Descartes’ dreams 
seem to preserve a powerful sense of rationality within them. He says, with regards to the 
apparent clarity of mind and perception he experiences in the waking state, which would 
presumably furnish him with the tools to distinguish the dream state from the waking 
state: “All this would not happen with such distinctness to someone asleep. Indeed! As if 
I did not remember other occasions when I have been tricked by exactly similar thoughts 
while asleep.”41 (Italics mine). Descartes is here suggesting that it is possible for dream 
consciousness to question the dream state. But this only worsens our situation, for such a 
phenomenon would give maximum indistinguishability between dreaming and being 
awake. In other words, if the only absolute difference between dreaming and being awake 
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is that one is an illusion, we are in trouble, for there is no way to distinguish such dreams 
even from the position of the waking state. 
This statement seems to suggest that our ability to reason correctly persists to 
some degree of efficiency in the dream state. In fact, it seems to come close to a form of 
lucid dreaming, which neither al-Ghazālī nor Descartes explicitly refer to in their 
arguments. It thus seems that for Descartes, even experiencing some weak form of lucid 
dreaming, where one does manage to challenge the dream state itself, only increases the 
indistinguishability of the dream state from the waking state. Furthermore, if this is true, 
it seems to commit him to the stronger version of his argument, in which the external 
world as a whole can be doubted. It will also have implications for the ordering of global 
and local states of illusion, which I will address in a following section. 
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6. The Evil Demon 
 
At the end of the two dream arguments, Descartes and al-Ghazālī are not on even 
epistemic footing. Descartes still thinks he knows more than al-Ghazālī after the dream 
argument. 
Descartes thus ends the First Meditation by delivering another argument to finish 
off his reliance on reason, universals and ontological simples: the omnipotent evil demon. 
The evil demon argument goes as follows: Suppose there is a supreme being that is all-
powerful and utterly transcendent in a divine sense (we might say: omniscient, 
omnipotent, omnipresent). This evil demon makes it his task to guarantee the 
deceitfulness of the most basic of human reasoning. Universals, logical necessity, 
particulars, sense-experience, consciousness, reason itself –– all of these are at the 
arbitrary whims of the evil demon, who is master of reality in this thought experiment. 
Even if the existence of this evil demon is highly unlikely, it is still possible, and it is 
therefore possible to doubt universals and logical necessity. The Meditator is thus left in 
total metaphysical doubt about everything. 
Now, before moving on, it shall be worth noting how exactly Descartes arrives at 
this argument. In between the dream argument and the demon argument, Descartes 
entertains another possible reason to doubt. He wonders whether our ability to make 
rational mistakes is compatible with God’s perfect goodness.42 For, why should God let 
us be deceived at all, if he is perfectly good? Of course, this question misses the 
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difference between being occasionally deceived, and being always deceived about 
everything. In the Fourth Meditation, Descartes shall revisit this problem and, after 
looking more closely at the distinction, suggest that being sometimes deceived is indeed 
compatible with God’s perfect goodness.43  
But since he does not have tools to make this claim just yet in the First 
Meditation, Descartes instead begins to entertain the possibility of a world without God, 
in which the Meditator is created by some mundane, imperfect causes, and in which there 
is no longer a guarantee of certitude from God. Since there is no perfect goodness over 
and above him, the Meditator is free to be occasionally or systematically deceived 
without limit.  
Thus, by the method of doubt, Descartes makes a developmental inversion in 
three steps. After moving from God’s perfect goodness and divine guarantee, Descartes 
moves to entertaining the possibility of a world without God and no guarantees, and 
finally to the inversion of God’s perfect goodness, the evil demon. Bear these moments in 
mind, for we shall revisit them in the final, concluding section. 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 CSM II, 40-3 
	   
27 
7. Global and Local States of Illusion 
 
I have alluded to local and global states of illusion at length in the previous 
sections. Let me now define these terms, before filling out how they feature in the two 
dream arguments sketched out above. 
By local states of illusion, I mean states of illusion that nonetheless stand in a 
relation with a transcendent state of consciousness, to which absolute reality is accessible 
or intelligible. A dream is a local state of illusion, for instance, if we suppose that the 
waking state: (1) accesses reality; (2) is the highest state of consciousness achievable, or, 
more strongly, the state of consciousness to which absolute reality is accessible or 
intelligible. From a local state of illusion, reality is still accessible in principle, but only to 
the transcendent state of consciousness.  
By global states of illusion, I mean states of illusion that do not stand in a relation 
with a transcendent state of consciousness, to which absolute reality is accessible or 
intelligible. A global state of illusion is the strongest form of skepticism: there is no way 
to discern whether reality is accessible or not; and there is no way to appeal to reality for 
verification, since reality is not accessible in principle. 
To clarify, the distinction I have drawn refers to metaphysical local or global 
states of illusion. Dream consciousness is immanently an epistemic global illusion, but it 
is metaphysically only a local illusion, since waking consciousness exists over and above 
it (and presumably has access to reality). 
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I argue that both Descartes and al-Ghazālī, at the end of their skeptical arguments, 
end up with metaphysical global states of illusion. At the end, both thinkers seem to think 
they know nothing – that is, that their knowledge is totally void of content. As I shall 
show in Part II, they are both incorrect about this. But let us leave this claim alone for 
now, and finish our comparison of the skeptical phases. 
 
Another way to think of the global states of illusion would be that their borders 
extend to the most transcendent position conceivable. This is certainly true of Descartes’ 
evil demon, but also possibly on the strong reading of his dream argument. The strong 
reading of the dream argument denies knowledge about the external world, or the source 
of one’s perceptions. Nonetheless, I think the strong dream argument would imply only a 
partially global state of illusion, as Descartes would still maintain the epistemic validity 
of simples, universals, and the scientific disciplines dependent on them.  
Descartes’ true global state of illusion comes from the evil demon. Since the evil 
demon has control of absolute reality and of Descartes’ consciousness, it can render 
Descartes’ consciousness in principle and in practice incapable of accessing reality. 
Meanwhile, al-Ghazālī suggests that dreams imply a global state of illusion. He 
explicitly refers to dreams as “giving the lie to the reason-judge.”44 He thinks the dream-
state implies a global state of illusion due to the generalizable relation of transcendence 
between states of consciousness, which we previously mentioned. If reason in general 
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cannot be trusted to provide us with knowledge, the waking state qua waking state also 
loses its veridicality. Let us look at al-Ghazālī’s full articulation of this notion:  
 
“So while everything you believe through sensation or intellection in your 
waking state may be true in relation to that state, what assurance have you that you may 
not suddenly experience a state which would have the same relation to your waking state 
as the latter has to your dreaming, and your waking state would be dreaming in relation to 
that new and further state? If you found yourself in such a state, you would be sure that 
all your rational beliefs were unsubstantial fancies. It may be that this state beyond reason 
is that which the Sufis claim is theirs. For they allege that, in the states they experience 
when they concentrate inwardly and suspend sensation, they see phenomena which are 
not in accord with the normal data of reason. Or it may be that this state is death… When 
a man dies… he will be told: ‘But We have removed from you your veil and today your 
sight is keen’ (Qur’an 50.21/22).”45 
 
 It is not that the dream state itself is a global state of illusion, but rather that the 
waking state and the dream state are both engulfed in a global state of illusion. 
Individually, they are local states of illusion.  
Per the above passage, either the possibility of certain knowledge is lost in a 
potential regress of transcendent states; or absolute reality resides in some other terminal 
realm which, due to its impenetrability and the dubitability of our cognitive faculties, is 
barred from us as we linger in an inescapable metaphysical local illusion.46 In this case, 
reason has as much authority on what is absolutely true as our cognitions have in the 
dream state.  
What is also worth keeping in mind for al-Ghazālī, is that his argument potentially 
also destroys the epistemic authority of the waking state over the dreaming state. If there 
is no appeal to absolute reality in the waking state at all, and reason cannot be trusted, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 RJM, 22-23. 
46 In this case, the waking world would be metaphysically a local illusion, but a global illusion as far as we 
are concerned, since reality or knowledge would be in principle inaccessible to us. 
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then why should the waking state be considered a better source of knowledge at all? But 
this would be to forget the distinguishability which only the waking state provides. 
Nevertheless, this is worth keeping in mind regarding his later views on prophetic 
dreams.  
Descartes’ evil demon serves the same function epistemologically as the third or 
regressive transcendent state(s) al-Ghazālī posits. They serve to demolish the possibility 
of certain knowledge in all respects. In order to fully clarify their positions, consider 
these visual representations below: 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Al-Ghazālī’s World of Metaphysical Global Illusion Figure 1.2: Descartes’ World of Metaphysical Global Illusion 
 
 
Now, with the ground of knowledge freshly razed on the same conclusion, it is for 
us to see how these two thinkers diverge in answering this common challenge. 
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Part II: Pulling Skepticism Inside Out 
 
8. Introduction to Part II 
 
In Part I, we found that both al-Ghazālī and Descartes conclude their skeptical 
phases with global states of skepticism. As we saw, these two global states of skepticism 
differ in their precise natures, though they formally share the same conclusion. They may 
yet differ in what they imply. 
The difference between these conclusions shall have immediate and far-reaching 
consequences for the comparative trajectories of al-Ghazālī and Descartes as they attempt 
to climb out of the pit of skepticism. It shall give a different meaning to the task and 
limitations of philosophy and reason, irrespective of whether truth and certainty can in 
fact be acquired. 
Despite the gulf that shall widen between the two thinkers, their initial moves 
against skepticism have a general similarity. Both try to ground knowledge in 
subjectivity. For Descartes, this is the indubitability of the cogito. For al-Ghazālī, it is the 
light of God; or, more specifically, it is the tasting [dhawq] of knowledge,47 which al-
Ghazālī later describes as characteristic of Sufi practices.  
Now, it seems as if there is already a difference in these two principles, even if 
they commonly regard subjectivity. To begin with, the cogito is a rational proposition. It 
seems to involve an inference –– a therefore –– even if it is immediately justified and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 McCarthy translates dhawq as “fruitional experience.” “Tasting” is a more literal translation. 
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valid. For al-Ghazālī, however, it seems the foundation of knowledge is more immediate 
and non-inferential. These are just surface remarks, however, and we shall see how they 
hold up. 
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9. Al-Ghazālī on Light, the Present, and First Principles 
 
At the very end of his skeptical phase, al-Ghazālī tells us that his skepticism is 
cured by the “effect of a light which God Most High cast into my breast.”48 He goes on to 
tell us that, “whoever thinks that the unveiling of truth depends on precisely formulated 
proofs has indeed straitened the broad mercy of God.” Finally, he concludes that first 
principles [al-awwaliyat]49 are unseekable, for they are “in the present (hadira),”50 and, 
since observation destroys what is in the present, that which is present “is lost and hides 
itself.”51  
Firstly, it is important to note that the light is cast into the heart. The subject is 
passive in receiving it, as God is the only efficient cause of it. Whereas al-Ghazālī alludes 
in this section to how one can better position oneself to receive these gusts of grace, the 
actual effect is not achievable by intellectual efforts alone. 
 Following these conclusions, al-Ghazālī then goes on to methodically criticize the 
metaphysics of various religious and philosophical disciplines in order to argue that first 
principles and the foundation of knowledge cannot be rationally discerned. But before 
going any further, it will be worth considering what al-Ghazālī means by this “light” 
which God places in his heart, along with his interesting comment regarding the 
evanescence of the present. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 RJM, 23 
49 In McCarthy’s translation, al-darruriyat and al-awwaliyat seem to be translated interchangeably. This 
seems to me a mistake, since al-darruriyat, being “necessary things” refers to propositions that are 
analytically true; meanwhile, al-awwaliyat, “the first things” refers to first principles. While it might or 
might not be true that first principles are analytically true, they are not conceptually identical. 
50 Italics mine. 
51 Munqidh, Ayad and Kamil, 30 
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 One might be immediately tempted to view this light as a metaphor. It would not 
be the first time, after all, that the illuminating properties of light are invoked to describe 
the discovery of knowledge. Indeed, Descartes uses such a metaphor when he invokes 
“the natural light.” For Descartes, “the natural light” seems to be a metaphor for the 
clearness and distinctness of logical necessity as it inheres in certain propositional, 
inferential or intuitive relations. It would be a mistake to make the same assumption 
about al-Ghazālī, however.  
For al-Ghazālī, it is exactly the reverse: physical light is a metaphor for the real 
light. In the mishkāt al-anwār [The Niche of Lights], he says, “…the real light is God 
and…the name ‘light’ for everything else is sheer metaphor, without reality.” 52 
Underneath his seemingly mundane usage of the word “light” in the munqidh lies a richly 
complex notion of light, which is presented in the mishkāt al-anwār. Let us briefly 
consider the thesis of the mishkāt. 
 In the mishkāt, al-Ghazālī claims that the essential property of light is that it 
makes things manifest. In the weakest sense, this means light makes being perceptible. In 
the strongest sense, it means light actually manifests being in the first place (or is the 
manifestation of that being). Al-Ghazālī further explains this by means of a hierarchy of 
lights.  
At the very bottom are objects that illuminate neither themselves, nor other things. 
These objects are utter darkness in the sense that they have non-being in and of 
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themselves, and in relation to other things.53 54 Then, there are objects such as burning 
coal, which illuminate themselves but not other things. Then, we move from flame to the 
sun, which fully illuminates itself and other objects. This is the first layer of the 
metaphor. The second layer involves the sensory faculties themselves, with specific 
attention to the physical eye. The physical eye is a light in the sense that it enables our 
perception in the first place, and therefore manifests the visual world to the mind.  
Above the sensory faculties and the physical eye is the inner eye of the rational 
faculty, which, once “disengaged” from the world of matter, “sees things as they are in 
themselves.”55 The rational faculty accesses “the world of dominion” [alam al-malukat], 
which I shall say more about shortly.56  
There are higher forms of light than even the rational faculty, however, and these 
are: the mystic’s insight and prophetic revelation. All three access the world of dominion 
[alam al-malukat], but to greater and lesser degrees. Furthermore, whereas the mystic’s 
insight is of similar quality as the prophet’s revelation, the prophet’s revelation is far 
greater in scope and quality. Here below is a visual representation of how the world of 
dominion might be proportionally intelligible to each respective faculty: 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 NL, 16 
54 In NL, 16, al-Ghazālī suggests that existence can be classified into: (1) the existence that a thing 
possesses in itself, and (2) the existence that it possesses in virtue of something else. 
55 As a side note, it is worth noting how this particular statement seems to mirror Descartes’ theory of 
intellection, especially regarding his famous wax example. 
56 NL, 10. 
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The World of Dominion 
 
 
Figure 2.0: Faculties of the Soul, Correspondent to Layers of the World of Dominion. 
 
 
 
Ultimately, all of these lights only manifest other things in relative fashion, for 
those lights are, in turn, each made manifest by a higher light. The highest and final light, 
however, is God, who is self-sufficiently manifest, and who manifests everything else. 
Interestingly, the subject-object distinction on this ontological account seems either 
purposefully blurred, or simply deemed irrelevant. Such subject-object blurring is 
characteristic of Sufi thought, particularly in dealing with the relation of the subject to the 
Divine. In this text, al-Ghazālī categorizes human perceptual, intellectual and spiritual 
faculties alongside each other and alongside physical objects, as if the structure of being 
and the power of manifestation uniformly underlays any subject-object structure. 
Al-Ghazālī thus far distinguishes between the world of material reality (alam al-
mulk), and the world of intellectual and spiritual reality (alam al-malukat).57 The two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 The distinction between these two worlds easily mirrors Platonic dualism, where we have the 
phenomenal, material world and the world of ideas.  
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realms are related such that the realm of mulk is a reflection of the realm of malukat.58 
The realm of malukat contains the existence of self-evident logical principles, such as the 
Law of Non-Contradiction, the Law of the Excluded Middle, the necessity of 
determinates in relation to determinables, etc.59 
 It should be noted that the rational faculty remains imperfect until death, 
however, whereupon absolute reality is revealed.60 Scott Girdner stresses that, for al-
Ghazālī, God transcends both realms of mulk and malukat. In keeping with the hierarchy 
of lights, Girdner tells us that for al-Ghazālī, “[B]oth the physical world and the ‘World 
of Dominion’ have contingent existence upon the one ultimate existent, God, who 
manifests all other beings.”61 One effective way of describing al-Ghazālī’s view is that all 
existence supervenes on God in layers.62 
The picture of ontology al-Ghazālī gives us, here, borrows a lot from Neoplatonic 
conceptions of reality, in which existence and intellect emanate down from the indivisible 
One. I shall have more to say about this Neoplatonic inheritance later in this paper, but 
for now it is worth keeping in mind. It is also worth bearing in mind that al-Ghazālī 
generally thought that God is neither immanent nor transcendent, but, as stated in the 
Qur’an (50:16), “closer to [man] than his jugular vein.” 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 NL, 27. 
59 NL, 10. 
60 In the mishkāt, al-Ghazālī quotes the same passage from the Qur’an [50:22] as he does in the munqidh in 
regards to this moment. 
61 Girdner, 24 
62 The passage at the end of NL, 24, is especially indicative of this, viz. with his example of the hand and its 
shadow. 
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In the second part of the mishkāt al-anwar, al-Ghazālī goes on to give an account 
of how each faculty of the soul functions in relation to the world. This part of his account 
seems to more easily imply a subject-object distinction, for it aims to describe human 
cognitive and spiritual faculties in relation to their respective realms. Here below is a 
table outlining al-Ghazālī’s conception of the faculties of the human soul, as presented in 
the mishkāt: 
 
Holy Prophetic 
Spirit [ruh al-
quds w-al-
nabawa] 
Ascribed to the friends of God63 [al-awlia’].64 This refers to 
mystic insight in its lower grade form, and to prophetic 
revelation in its higher grade form. 
Reflective Spirit The Spirit that “works according to dialectics and syllogistics 
which combine premises and derive conclusions.” 65 
Accordingly, this seems to be the Spirit responsible for 
inference. 
Rational Spirit  The Spirit through which “noble, divine knowledge takes 
place.”66  al-Ghazālī suggest this is the faculty that apprehends 
universals, and which is responsible for intuition.67 
Imaginal Spirit Bridges Sensory and Reflective Spirit. Represents images, 
measures, shapes, directions. Is permeated by and points to 
“rational lights.” Helps to organize rational knowledge.68 
Sensory Spirit Responsible for sense-perception. 
Table 1.0: al-Ghazālī’s Hierarchy of Faculties 
 
Every faculty in Figure 2.0 is a light insofar as it makes other things manifest. But 
so too are the objects of those faculties lights. Both the faculties and their objects have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 The term “wali”, or, “friend of God”, generally refers to people of high spiritual and moral caliber. In 
this particular context, it seems to refer specifically to enlightened mystics, however. The Sufi saint Rabi’a 
al-Adawiyya (714/717/718 — 801 CE) serves as a good (perhaps paradigmatic) example of such a friend of 
God. As a devotional mystic, her life was dedicated to fulfilling such a friendship with God. Cf. Early 
Islamic Mysticism, 151-170. 
64 NL, 41 
65 Girdner, 26 
66 NL, 40 
67 NL, 37 
68 NL, 39 
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being, and both have being which is contingent upon God. The structural ontology of 
light thus transcends subject-object distinctions,69 for it uniformly pervades the faculties 
of knowledge and the objects of knowledge. Light is both the cause and the object of our 
knowledge. 
 
We shall return to the mishkāt and reference its content later on in this paper, but 
for now let us use what we have learned from it and return to the munqidh. I noted that, at 
the end of his skeptical phase, al-Ghazālī makes three crucial claims: (1) His skepticism 
is cured by the effect of a light God places in his heart; (2) Knowledge is not dependent 
on demonstrative proofs; (3) First principles are present to the mind, and unseekable due 
to the destructive relation between observation and the present. 
These claims should not be taken separately from each other. We already have 
enough background information to make sense of claims (1) and (2), but, since (3) is just 
as crucial, it will benefit us to elucidate what al-Ghazālī means. Wilhelm Dilthey’s 
explanation of the problem between observation and the present, as presented in his Draft 
For a Critique of Historical Reason, shall prove helpful here: 
 
A lived experience is a temporal sequence in which every state is in flux before 
it can become a distinct object. Indeed, because the subsequent moment always builds on 
the previous one, each becomes something past before it can be grasped. It then appears 
as a memory that has the freedom to expand.  But observation destroys lived experience. 
Thus there is nothing more puzzling than the kind of continuum or nexus known as a 
piece of life-history. The only thing that remains constant about this nexus, is that its 
form is a structural relation. And if we wanted, through a special kind of effort, to 
experience the stream of life itself as reflecting its bank, always seeming the same, but 
never really, according to Heraclitus – a case of the many and the one – then we would 
fall prey again to the law of life according to which every moment of life that is observed, 
no matter how much the flow is concentrated on, is a remembered moment and no longer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Mirrors Plato’s discussion of knowledge in the Republic, 508-e. 
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a flow; it is arrested by attention, which fixes what is essentially fluid. Thus we cannot 
grasp the essence of this life.70 
 
Because of this characteristic of real time, temporal succession cannot, strictly 
speaking, be experienced. The presence of the past replaces immediate experience for us. 
When we want to observe time, the act of observation destroys it because it fixes things 
by means of attentiveness; it halts the flow and rigidifies what is in the process of 
becoming. We experience both the changes in what-just-was and that such changes are 
occurring. But we do not experience the flux itself. Permanence is experienced when we 
return to what we have just seen or heard and find it still there.71   
 
 
We learned from the mishkāt that al-Ghazālī thinks of light as manifestation. Let 
us briefly consider a translation of his first claim in view of this new information: His 
skepticism was cured by the effect of a manifestation God placed in his heart. 
Manifestation [al-dhohoor], here, has the strict sense of occurrence or becoming-ness. 
Manifestation is closely related to the passage of time, insofar as that which manifests 
either (1) appears in the present, whereas it did not before, or (2) sustains or provides a 
thing with being. The sense of (2) seems a lot closer to al-Ghazālī’s meaning, for it 
recalls the Qur’anic notion of God as the Sustainer, and it also recalls his own notion of 
God as the ultimate and realest light; in any case, I do not think these senses of the word 
must be mutually exclusive.  
The point is that al-Ghazālī thinks first principles manifest themselves to the mind 
as a strict condition of their being in the present and for the mind in the present.72 It 
should be no surprise, following Aristotle, that first principles should be so intimately 
connected to being. What al-Ghazālī seems to be saying is that first principles cannot 
serve as epistemic foundations; rather, knowledge is derived in virtue of certain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Dilthey, 216 
71 Dilthey, 217 
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ontological principles. In other words, there are no epistemic foundations for knowledge, 
only ontological foundations. Furthermore, he thinks being as such is not a sufficient 
description of first principles. Being-in-the-present and being-in-and-for-the-mind, rather, 
explain the nature of first principles.  
Watt’s translation of the passage in question is interesting in this regard, for it 
includes an addition, which, while not perfectly warranted by the Arabic text, may be 
revealing of the subtler implications of al-Ghazālī’s word choice. Watt’s translation reads 
as follows: “[F]irst principles are not sought, since they are present and to hand; and if 
something present is sought for, it becomes hidden and lost.”73 (Italics mine).  
Watt’s choice to add “to hand” to the sentence is not some anachronistic 
Heideggerian imposition on the text. Rather, it is due to the fact that the word for 
“present” (hadira) shares the same root (رر – ضض – حح) as the word for “ready, at hand”74 
(muhaddar). Arabic functions on such root words whose permutations form a nexus of 
related meanings. Indeed, al-Ghazālī’s insistence on giving primacy to lived experience,75 
and his claim that observation epistemically destroys first principles, should be some 
indication of his proto-phenomenological approach.  
Now, compare Watt’s translation with McCarthy’s translation, which replaces 
“present and to hand” with “present in the mind.” A certain reading of McCarthy’s 
translation might suggest that al-Ghazālī thinks first principles are innate concepts, which 
cannot be gazed at by the mind’s eye due to the fact that those ‘concepts’ constitute that 
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mind’s eye to begin with. I do not want to rule out this possibility, but I think it may be 
reading too much into the text.  
Yet another temptation might be to say that al-Ghazālī thinks first principles are 
given but not explicitly known; or, perhaps we might say he thinks first principles 
constitute knowledge, but cannot be knowledge. These are appealing theories, and I do 
not think they are fruitless; there is simply not enough evidence in the munqidh to permit 
the use of such contemporary terms to explain al-Ghazālī’s meaning. Al-Ghazālī makes it 
clear in The Marvels of the Heart that he considers the elementary principles of logic 
(such as the Law of Non-Contradiction) to be ontological givens, and so it is clear that at 
least those principles constitute part of what is manifest to the heart.76 
What we can say with more confidence is the following: Whatever these 
ontological first principles are, they cannot be sustained under the rational gaze, they 
cannot be expressed in language, and they are non-inferential. It is unclear whether the 
light al-Ghazālī receives in his heart (1) amounts to those ontological first principles, or 
rather, (2) refers to mystic insight about those first principles.77 He says, “this light is the 
key to most knowledge,”78 which seems to support (1).  
At this point in the autobiography, al-Ghazālī is still only talking about his 
experience as a young man dealing with a skeptical crisis, which was resolved prior to the 
more serious spiritual crisis that led him to Sufi practices. Since he did not seriously 
engage in Sufi practices until much later in life, it is unclear if he is here claiming to have 	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received mystic insight, or rather if he is retroactively describing his experience in mystic 
terms. Perhaps he claims to have received mystic insight as a gust of grace from God, 
prior to ‘earning’ that insight, so to speak, later in life. Either way, I think we can gather a 
fairly clear idea of his meaning. The manifestation he refers to is immediate in the sense 
that it can only be known by subjective experience, cannot be rationally demonstrated, 
and cannot be properly expressed in language.  
Thus far, we have unearthed al-Ghazālī’s ontological claims about first principles 
in the aftermath of skepticism, assessed his psychology of the soul, and also seen how 
epistemic knowledge, for him, is grounded in ontic subjectivity. Furthermore, we have 
seen the beginnings of his account of reason’s limitations. There is much more to say 
about al-Ghazālī’s epistemological and ontological views, but for now let us return to 
Descartes. Al-Ghazālī has made a number of positive claims, some which shall cohere 
with Descartes, and some which shall conflict. 
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10. The Cogito and the Cartesian Loop  
 
There are two Descartes. There is the Descartes who idealizes reason to the point 
of discarding the interiority of children, madmen, animals; and who insists on the 
essentially quantifiable order of the world.79 This is the same Descartes who is often 
accused of merely being interested in “setting up the Cartesian machine” so that man can 
become “lord and master” of nature.80 The other Descartes is the one who grounds 
knowledge first and foremost in subjectivity, announces the permanent irreducibility of 
the mind and the body to each other, and gives seemingly circular arguments for the 
existence of God in apparent violation of his own principles. Both of these Descartes 
have been inflated to evil demon proportions in modern philosophy within both the 
Continental and Analytic traditions. 
Polemics and exaggerations aside, there is indeed a crucial apparent tension in 
Descartes’ thought. At a high level of generality, this is the tension between reason and 
experience. Let us consider Descartes’ post-skeptical moves and see if we can make 
sense of this tension. 
 
Unlike al-Ghazālī, Descartes seems to immediately provide us with a proposition 
– expressed in language and rationally demonstrated – as the starting point of knowledge. 
This Archimedean point, as Descartes calls it, is the cogito: I think, therefore I am. The 
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cogito ostensibly serves as the foundation for knowledge because it contains its own 
immanent criteria for certainty. There is nothing else against which it can be measured or 
judged in order to achieve its unquestionable truth. But just what exactly affords it these 
properties? What is so special about the cogito that it can defeat the evil demon? Or, 
more modestly put: what is so special about it that it can give us a way to defeat the 
demon?  
The question now regards the epistemic or ontological status of the cogito. On a 
surface reading, it seems Descartes initially presents the cogito as a piece of epistemic, 
discursive knowledge. On this reading, it is a logically complex proposition,81 which is 
arrived at by inference, and which the Meditator has cognitive awareness of. If we thus 
take the epistemic cogito to be the foundation of knowledge, then subsequent 
propositions should be made true by appeal to the cogito.  
Suppose we have the cogito (C). From the cogito, we derive and justify a 
subsequent proposition (p). On this understanding of the cogito’s function, we might 
characterize that function merely as follows: I can know that p is certain if and only if I 
first know that C is certain. I know that C is certain, therefore p is certain. This seems to 
be the prima facie understanding of Descartes’ scheme, wherein the cogito serves simply 
as a self-justified, epistemic foundation to other premises; it secures knowledge of the 
self and the mind, and then – somehow – lets us climb back into the world. If that is the 
correct understanding, then it shall lead to numerous problems for Descartes. Such a 
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reading of the Meditations strikes me as simplistic, both hermeneutically and 
philosophically. 
Not only is the scheme above illegitimate in the lingering shadow of the demon, it 
is also an enthymeme. In the narrative context of the Second Meditation, Descartes has 
not yet established (or rehabilitated) the rule of evidence that tells him what counts as 
certainty. The cogito therefore cannot serve as an epistemic foundation for knowledge 
before the demon is defeated. The cogito must thus achieve the following: (1) Establish 
its own certainty; (2) Give us a way to the rule of evidence that can make us aware of (1); 
(3) Serve as a foundation for other, less immediately justified propositions. 
Let us consider a number of possible challenges the cogito must overcome to 
fulfill these three conditions, that we might better understand Descartes’ intentions.  
One problem with the cogito, first put forth by Pierre Daniel Huet,82 and also cited 
and developed by Watson,83 regards its discursive character and the passage of time in 
the process of making inferences. Before the cogito can serve as the Archimedean 
foundation for knowledge, it must itself be secure. On Watson’s and Huet’s readings, the 
cogito is not secure due to the fallibility of memory. For them, the cogito cannot 
legitimately be expressed in the form, “I think, therefore I am”, for, by the time the 
Meditator has moved through the process of inference, the thinking I no longer is, but 
was. It is worth noting, one of Huet’s crucial premises is that all thought, including the 
expression of simple relations, is discursive.84 
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Descartes’ counter to the argument from discursiveness is already contained in 
Rule XI of the Rules For the Direction of The Mind, and in various replies to objections 
of the Meditations. Descartes claims logically complex propositions can be intuited as 
wholes,85 atemporally, and non-discursively.  
But, Watson argues, even if the cogito is not taken as a discursive argument, but 
rather as a whole propositional intuition, then still the logical relation between the I think 
and the I am falls victim to Huet’s argument due to the fact that reason itself has not yet 
been rehabilitated. For, the recognition of the I’s existence only follows distinctly after it 
thinks. As Watson puts it, Huet’s criticism suggests that if the cogito is supposed to be 
discursive, then it fails due to the fallibility of memory; if it is supposed to merely be a 
complex, intuited proposition, then it fails due to the fallibility of reason. In this 
objection, we find echoes of al-Ghazālī’s point regarding how first principles are 
evanescently tied to the present. 
Watson further criticizes Descartes on the grounds that he can only know that 
something exists, and not know anything characteristic about that which exists. In other 
words, the cogito is empty of content, in that it only guarantees existence as such, and not 
the existence of any particular thing.86 Watson extends this empty content criticism to 
Descartes’ claims about reason, the existence of God, and his own essence as a thinking 
thing (res cogitans). 
There are two questions at stake here. One regards the role of memory and 
temporality in securing the cogito as the foundation of knowledge; the other regards how 	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we can start to rehabilitate reason, if its powers are necessary to secure the cogito in the 
first place. Both of these problems shall lead us to consider the Cartesian Circle, 
comparisons to al-Ghazālī, and the rule of evidence more closely. First let us consider 
some preliminary solutions to the problems of memory and the relation of cogito to sum. 
The problem of memory in relation to the cogito is also important to the Cartesian 
Circle, since some philosophers, such as Willis Doney,87 have argued that the Circle in 
fact aims to solve the memory problem. For Doney, God’s role in the Circle is not to 
guarantee clear and distinct perception, but to guarantee the veracity of memory. This 
solution can also be deployed to explain Descartes’ claim that atheists cannot know or 
have certainty of anything;88 for, without God to guarantee their memory, they are unable 
to cling even to the cogito. 
Harry Frankfurt has forcefully argued against Doney’s view in his paper Memory 
and the Cartesian Circle. Meanwhile, he has also provided an interpretation of Descartes 
in Demons, Dreamers and Madmen that allows us to solve Huet’s problem. Frankfurt 
shows that Descartes in fact never expresses the cogito in the form, “I think, therefore I 
am,” anywhere in the Meditations. 89  The closest Descartes comes to it is a few 
paragraphs into the Second Meditation, where he says, “…I must finally conclude that 
this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or 
conceived in my mind.”  
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The textual evidence here is clear: Descartes presents the cogito, at least in the 
narrative context of the Meditations, as an intuited proposition, and not as a discursive 
argument. So much for Huet’s argument from discursiveness. How about the second horn 
of Huet’s criticism, wherein the lingering presence of the evil demon precludes the 
relation between I think and I am from being intelligible?  
Frankfurt shows how Descartes himself recognizes the difficulty of justifying the 
logical relation between I think and I am.90 Furthermore, it is worth noting that in the 
Second Meditation, Descartes actually does initially formulate the cogito in the way Huet 
and Watson say he must. Descartes says, “Does it follow now that I too do not exist? No: 
if I convinced myself of something, then I certainly existed.”91 Note the past tense of this 
first formulation. When Descartes subsequently recognizes that the demon cannot 
deceive him if he does not think, he insists on the inseparability of cogito from sum, but 
nowhere does he mention that this proposition or its internal relations are beyond doubt.92 
Not yet, at least. 
Descartes’ project at the start of the Second Meditation, rather, as Frankfurt puts 
it, is to show that “a premiss from which sum can be elicited is an essential and 
inescapable element of every context in which the need for assurance concerning sum 
arises. The permanent availability of sum rests upon its derivability from a premiss that is 
necessarily available whenever it is needed.”93 Descartes’ claim is not yet that the cogito 
is certain and beyond doubt, or that sum is a ubiquitously true conclusion, for the 	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Meditator shall not always be thinking about his own existence. It is simply that 
whenever sum is invoked, it shall be valid and true due to a permanently, intrinsically 
available premise for it. A person can never be aware that she does not exist, and so the 
relation between cogito and sum holds and cannot be doubted whenever the question of 
sum arises.  
 If we were now to insist on a connection to al-Ghazālī’s comment regarding the 
nature of first principles, I would reformulate Frankfurt’s comment as follows: A valid 
premise for sum and sum’s derivability from that premise are ready at hand and manifest, 
in whatever moment the need for the conclusion sum arises. 
Indeed, Frankfurt’s interpretation of Descartes here can serve to push the 
Ghazālīan connection even further. In regards to the logical relation and contingency of 
cogito and sum, Frankfurt says: 
 
“[Descartes’] conclusion can appropriately be formulated as an ascription 
of logically necessary truth to a certain proposition, but that proposition is not 
sum. It is the proposition that sum is true whenever he utters or conceives it…The 
conclusion in no way denies, of course, that sum is logically contingent. When he 
describes sum as necessarily true on certain occasions, he does not mean that on 
those occasions it possesses the logical property of necessary truth. He means 
that it is a logically necessary truth that sum is true on those occasions.”94 
 
There is plenty of textual evidence for these claims. Let us briefly consider some 
of it.  
Descartes offers his conclusion to the opening questions of the Second Meditation 
in the following form: “I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is 
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necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind.”95 96 (Italics 
mine). The key part of his conclusion is the whenever, which implies a temporal 
contingency.  
Furthermore, in his reply to Gassendi, Descartes insists on the “metaphysical 
certainty” of cogito ergo sum, above such propositions as ambulo ergo sum. This 
metaphysical certainty is afforded due to substantive rather than formal reasons. There is 
no situation in which cogito does not warrant sum, though there are plenty of conceivable 
instances in which such propositions as ambulo do not warrant sum, even if the formal 
inference is valid. Furthermore, Descartes says, “I may not… make the inference, ‘I walk, 
therefore I exist’ except insofar as the awareness of walking is a thought.”97 (Italics 
mine).  
The cogito is thus the best possible example of such an awareness, since it is 
always substantively true as well as formally valid. Other cogitationes equally warrant 
the formal inference therefore I am, for they all have the logical form: B(a) à (∃x)(x=a). 
Yet, not all instances of this form are always immune to doubt. Frankfurt gives the 
example of pain:98 when I am in pain, I can be certain that I am in pain; yet, when I am 
not in pain, I cannot be certain that I am in pain. 
Thus, while it may seem as if Descartes initially presents the foundation for 
knowledge as the cogito itself, the true foundation has another form. It is, as with al-
Ghazālī, an ontological condition, which imbues cogito ergo sum with metaphysical 	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certainty and therefore with justification; it is not an epistemic principle which must be 
known beforehand in order to provide this justification. In other words, the reason why it 
is an ontological foundation and not an epistemic foundation, is that the Meditator does 
not need to know about it in order to gain its epistemic benefits; it is simply a provision 
of his being, in that moment.  
Part of the conclusion of this episode is that no instance of sum shall ever occur 
without cogito. It is on that conclusion that Descartes manages to give content to the 
cogito; namely, by concluding that he is a thinking thing. His subsequent ruminations99 
about his own essence end in “sum res cogitans” exactly due to the fact that every 
instance of one shall come with the other, whereas the same cannot be said of other 
predicates. He is a thinking thing precisely because he cannot separate thinking from his 
being.  
To deny, then, that Descartes can know that his own mind or self is the I is to 
make a phenomenological error: there is an intrinsically subjective character to thinking, 
which clearly and distinctly designates it as one’s own. In any case, it does not matter, for 
Descartes’ purposes, whether the cogito has content at the outset; it is part of the cogito’s 
function in his overall project that it should provide a ground from which its own content 
can be derived. 
There is also another, more general and implicit way in which Descartes gives 
content to the I. From the above conclusions, we can see how Descartes delimits a sphere 
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of experience which gains total immunity from skepticism, merely in virtue of the I being 
aware of that experience.100  
Suppose the proposition: I see a chair. Whereas the chair’s existence may remain 
in question, the seeing of the chair does not (once it is attended to by the mind). This 
seeing comes with its own fulfilled criteria for certainty, just like the cogito. In these 
cases, where we are strictly referring to the awareness that is immanently available to the 
experience, the I imposes itself regardless of whatever state it is in. In other words, 
whatever actually attaches itself to the I (1) has the same absolute givenness and certainty 
as the I; and (2) warrants the inference, therefore I am. As Husserl puts it in The Idea of 
Phenomenology, “[the cogitationes imply] no riddle, and therefore no riddle of 
transcendence.”101 102  
 
 
I previously mentioned three conditions the cogito must fulfill in its role in 
Descartes’ scheme. These were to: (1) Establish its own certainty; (2) Give us a way to 
the rule of evidence that can make us aware of (1); (3) Serve as a foundation for other, 
less immediately justified propositions. Descartes thus far gives us enough reason to trust 
(1), though we cannot be epistemically certain of it for we do not yet have (2) or (3). Let 
us consider the Cartesian Circle to see how he intends to provide us with these.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Husserl insists on this point throughout his lectures in The Idea of Phenomenology, and first expresses it 
in Lecture II, pp. 23-28. 
101 Husserl, 45. 
102 There is a great deal more to Husserl’s account of the cogitationes and his notions of immanence and 
transcendence, but for the purposes of this paper, this will suffice. Cf. The Idea of Phenomenology, 
Lectures II-V. 
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It is at this point in the Meditations that Descartes sheds the patience of many 
readers. To begin with, it is unclear how Descartes can derive and justify subsequent 
conclusions from his one Archimedean premise, sound as it may be. The failure of the 
cogito to fulfill its purpose, to Descartes’ detractors, resounds even more loudly when 
followed by an apparent logical circle attempting to epistemically transcend the 
subjective mind. Indeed, on this gloomy reading of the Meditations, it seems the cogito 
fails to do more than delimit the realm of certainty around the contours of the Meditator’s 
mind, leaving the subjective realm as “a winking point of light in a dark void,” as Paul 
MacDonald puts it.103 
I shall argue, following James Van Cleve, that the general form of the Cartesian 
Circle is not a mistake in reasoning. Rather, it is a valid demonstration of Descartes’  
defeat of the evil demon. I am here only concerned with the general logical structure of 
his argument, and not with the particular soundness of it. I shall argue that even the rule 
of evidence (clearness and distinctness) is not exactly an epistemic foundation for 
knowledge, but an ontological foundation. Unlike al-Ghazālī, however, Descartes thinks 
we can eventually come to rationally know this ontological foundation. 
In the Third Meditation, Descartes gives us the rule of evidence. After reflecting 
on the conditions under which he came to the conclusion “sum res cogitans” (I am a 
thinking thing), he says, “So I now seem to be able to lay it down as a general rule that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 MacDonald, 78. 
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whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true.”104 It is also in this Meditation that 
he provides his first proof for the existence of God.  
The Cartesian Circle arises when Descartes invokes God to guarantee the escape 
out of his own mind, so to speak. Despite having laid down the epistemic principle of 
knowledge, the Meditator now faces the problem of actually knowing external objects. So 
far, the rule of evidence has only provided the Meditator with subjective knowledge. 
Further contemplation leads the Meditator to consider that many ideas or objects of 
knowledge could be contained (potentially) or generated (actually) within his own mind. 
If Descartes had stopped here, he might have arrived at similar conclusions to Bishop 
Berkeley. 
But Descartes makes another crucial claim early on in the Third Meditation: 
“Now it is manifest by the natural light that there must be at least as much reality in the 
efficient cause and total cause as in the effect of that cause.”105 By applying this causal 
principle to his own finiteness, Descartes then claims to gain clear and distinct knowledge 
of the existence of God, the infinite, the all-powerful, and the most real,106 upon whom all 
existence is contingent.107 Since God cannot be a deceiver by his very essence,108 
Descartes stands triumphant over the corpse of the evil demon.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 CSM II, 24 
105 CSM II, 28 
106 CSM II, 31. “On the contrary, I clearly understand that there is more reality in an infinite substance than 
in a finite one…” 
107 CSM II, 33, 35 
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By the Fifth Meditation, Descartes shall have made all sorts of positive claims 
regarding truth, being, and causality; he shall also have asserted the certainty of the rule 
of evidence, in virtue of his proofs for the existence of God. 
As Arnauld and many other readers have pointed out, however, this argument 
appears to be circular, or to beg the question. Here is Van Cleve’s presentation of the 
apparent circle:109 
 
The first arc: I can know (be certain) that (p) whatever I perceive clearly and distinctly is 
true only if I first know (am certain) that (q) God exists and is not a deceiver. 
 
The second arc: I can know (be certain) that (q) God exists and is not a deceiver only if I 
first know (am certain) that (p) whatever I perceive clearly and distinctly is true. 
 
  
To interpret Descartes’ scheme this way, one must first assert that Descartes’ 
claims rest on the following premises: (1) all thought is discursive and (2) there are only 
epistemic foundations (if any) to knowledge. I have already shown why (1) is clearly 
incorrect on Descartes’ own terms. The falsity of (2) can be found in the Second Set of 
Replies, where Descartes says: 
 
“When someone says ‘I am thinking, therefore I am, or I exist’, he does not 
deduce existence from thought by means of a syllogism, but recognizes it as something 
self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind. This is clear from the fact that if he were 
deducing it by means of a syllogism, he would have to have had previous knowledge of 
the major premiss ‘Everything which thinks is, or exists’; yet in fact he learns it from 
experiencing in his own case that it is impossible that he should think without existing.110 
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From this passage, it is clear that Descartes thinks we can have justified epistemic 
knowledge that does not rely on previously known ‘epistemic’ premises.  
Van Cleve’s solution to the Circle clarifies and develops this very point. On Van 
Cleve’s view, Descartes escapes the charges of circularity precisely because he need only 
fall under the rule of evidence through the Circle’s first arc; he need not know that the 
rule itself is certain. In Van Cleve’s words, “…by falling under proposition (A) (that is, 
the C&D Rule), [Descartes] becomes certain of premises from which he eventually 
derives proposition (A) itself. But since he does not have to use proposition (A) at any 
step along the way, there is no circle.”111  
Indeed, I have already incorporated Van Cleve’s solution into my analysis of the 
cogito. In the Second Meditation, the Meditator gives himself warrant to use the cogito to 
derive other conclusions since it appears to him clearly and distinctly, though he does not 
know that it is clear and distinct yet. By following this track in virtue of the rule of 
evidence, he eventually arrives at a set of conclusions that allow him to derive the 
certainty of the rule of evidence itself, thereby retroactively authenticating his argument 
for the existence of God and all its premises. 
Van Cleve further provides a useful chronology of the Meditator’s successive 
conclusions, which helps to clarify the correct trajectory of the Meditator’s thoughts: 
 
 
(1) I think, the causal 
maxims, etc. 
Propositions known because 
they are clearly and distinctly 
perceived. 
(2) God exists, God is no Propositions known because 	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deceiver. they are clearly and distinctly 
perceived to follow from 
premises at level (1). 
(3) Whatever I perceive 
clearly and distinctly is 
certain. 
 Principle known because it is 
clearly and distinctly perceived 
to follow from propositions at 
level (2) 
(4) I perceive clearly and 
distinctly that I think, etc. 
New premises, one 
corresponding to each premise at 
level (1) 
(5) I am certain that I think, 
etc. 
Propositions known because 
they are clearly and distinctly 
perceived to follow from 
propositions at levels (3) and (4) 
 Table 2.0: Descartes’ Successive Conclusions112 
 
 
The Cartesian Circle, as it turns out, is not a circle but a loop. We begin by 
knowing in virtue of the rule of evidence, and then move to epistemically authenticate 
that rule from a higher order position. We must also not forget the performative quality of 
the Meditations. Aside from demonstrating the principle of certainty (rule of evidence; 
clarity and distinctness), the Loop is a concrete deployment of that principle in a piece of 
reasoning.  
Prior to when knowledge of the rule of evidence is uncovered, the Meditator does 
not have a general principle to secure his certainty about the cogito. Nonetheless, since 
each instance of thought produces the premises and derivability for the certainty of being, 
the Meditator has warrant to use the cogito (at least when he is attentively intuiting it) as 
a premise to some further conclusion. Descartes grants that even an atheist can get this 
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far, for there is no knowledge of a general principle needed to guarantee the necessary 
truths of a priori, analytic propositions while they are being intuited.113  
God’s role in the Cartesian Loop, then, is to provide the Meditator with the means 
to secure knowledge of the general rule of evidence in connection with conclusions that 
were derived merely in virtue of it. This general connection guarantees that true 
propositions can be taken as certain even when we are not presently intuiting them. Such 
propositions as the cogito can thus be taken as having the property of logical necessity, as 
opposed to being only necessarily true whenever they are intuited, which was the 
provisional conclusion the Meditator drew before establishing the rule of evidence. 
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11. The Task and Limits of Reason 
 
In the previous two sections, we considered the conclusions al-Ghazālī and 
Descartes arrive at regarding the foundation of knowledge. Both of them claim that there 
is no epistemic starting point for knowledge, for metaphysical knowledge begins with the 
provision of an ontological condition.   
Yet, by the time Descartes provides us with the cogito, the two already diverge 
significantly. Al-Ghazālī does not identify what the foundations are – he merely asserts 
that they exist. Descartes’ eventual demonstration of the rule of evidence and his 
validation of reason as the highest faculty of the mind runs against al-Ghazālī’s 
conclusions. For al-Ghazālī, first principles can be relied upon, but not rationally known. 
Furthermore, al-Ghazālī never immanently rehabilitates reason,114 unless we count the 
recognition of a higher-grade faculty (mystic insight) as a rational achievement. 
What does all of this mean for reason, and for the task of philosophy? In this 
section, I shall consider what the limits of reason are for each thinker, and how 
philosophy is transformed as a result. These considerations shall eventually lead me to 
argue, in a subsequent section, that differences stemming from their skeptical phases 
inform their conclusions. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 That is, al-Ghazālī does not use reason in order to validate reason. This may actually be a larger logical 
circle looming around Descartes’ work, but I shall not explore that possibility here. 
	   
61 
It is clear that for Descartes, reason at its best is the apprehension of clear and 
distinct intuitions. By the end of the Meditations, Descartes will have privileged primary 
qualities, which are geometric and correlate to extended substance, but which are known 
abstractly by intellectual perception. In discussing the thousand-sided figure in the Sixth 
Meditation, which the imagination cannot represent, though the understanding can, 
Descartes arrives at a picture of the world that is highly accessible to reason.  
 But just what is reason at its best for al-Ghazālī? An imprudent reading of the 
munqidh would suggest that al-Ghazālī completely disregards the power of reason –– in 
effect, remaining a skeptic about the powers of reason –– in favor of mystic insight. But 
this is not the correct reading of the munqidh, and to show why shall require a look at al-
Ghazālī’s further claims. 
The charge of anti-intellectualism has been leveled against al-Ghazālī at least 
since Ibn Rushd wrote his tahafut al-tahafut [Incoherence of the Incoherence]. We 
subsequently find much of Islamic philosophy wrestling with the tension between these 
two thinkers.115 Since then, some116 have gone so far as to blame al-Ghazālī for the 
decline of scientific and philosophical life in the Islamic world.117 Undoubtedly, if these 
charges were true, we would conclude that al-Ghazālī and Descartes arrive at very 
different positions indeed. Whereas Descartes’ rationalism is not in question, there is 
ambiguity, both historically and, to a lesser extent, philosophically and textually, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 For a good discussion and representation of this tension, which attempts a middle ground, cf. Ibn 
Tufayl’s Hayy Ibn Yaqzan, esp. pp. 95 – 103. 
116 Haq, esp. pp. 39–42. 
117 This is of course an over estimation, and grossly ignores other factors such as the Mongol invasions, 
which led to the sacking of Baghdad after the Siege of Baghdad in 1258, the intellectual center of the 
Islamic world at the time. 
	   
62 
surrounding al-Ghazālī’s position on the task of reason. Let us therefore consider al-
Ghazālī’s position more closely before comparing it to Descartes’. 
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11.1. Al-Ghazālī’s Critique of Metaphysics 
 
Part of the ambiguity surrounding al-Ghazālī’s claims is due to his narrow use of 
the words “philosophy” and “philosophers.” It shall therefore be important to clarify and 
bear in mind that al-Ghazālī has a very specific view of philosophy, which consists more 
of particular philosophical traditions than of philosophy as such. When he speaks of “the 
philosophers,” he is chiefly referring to his Neo-Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic 
contemporaries, with especial regard to al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. Al-Ghazālī also briefly 
mentions the pre-Socratics, whom he divides into two sub-categories: the Materialists and 
the Naturalists. He further regards Plato, Aristotle and their intellectual descendants as 
the Theists. 
In the munqidh, al-Ghazālī provides a succinct and lucid list of his grievances 
with the philosophical tradition of the Theists. As one explores this list, it becomes 
obvious that, unlike his caricature, al-Ghazālī does not reject philosophy as such. One 
cannot reject philosophy unphilosophically, and al-Ghazālī makes it clear in the munqidh 
and in the tahafut al-falasifa [Incoherence of the Philosophers] that he knows this. He 
insists that one can only defeat rational argument by rational argument. Besides, he has 
much praise for the various achievements of philosophy, particularly in logic and the 
empirical sciences.  
Rather, al-Ghazālī’s problem is specifically with rational (or natural) metaphysics. 
He does have some critical remarks about the sociological and spiritual consequences of 
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certain philosophical disciplines, such as the arrogance bred by success in the empirical 
or logical sciences, but no discipline is problematic to him in itself besides metaphysics.  
He has the following to say about the wayward history of metaphysics: 
 
“It is in the metaphysical sciences that most of the philosophers’ errors are 
found. Owing to the fact that they could not carry out apodeictic demonstration according 
to the conditions they had postulated in logic, they differed a great deal about 
metaphysical questions.”118 
 
 
The particularly Kantian ring of this passage may surprise contemporary readers. 
But it should not be surprising if we consider al-Ghazālī’s previous work, the tahafut al-
falasifa. The tahafut is very reminiscent of Kant’s Antinomies, in that it aims at 
systematically showing the internal inconsistencies and impossibilities of traditional 
metaphysics, often by means of reductio ad absurdum. I should note that I am not the 
first to observe this similarity. Paul Edwards, in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, remarks 
that some have read the tahafut as “a more incisive and decisive critique of metaphysics 
than that of Kant.”119  
To briefly summarize his critique of metaphysics, al-Ghazālī argues that twenty of 
“the philosophers’” claims are unproved, contradictory, falsifiable, or generally resting 
on no firm premises. Most of these claims concern theological questions about God, but 
some concern causality, the reality (or irreality) of universals, and soul-body dualism. 
Since al-Ghazālī’s aim in the tahafut is primarily to show that his opponents’ 
arguments fail on their own terms, he nonetheless accepts some of their conclusions. He 	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merely insists that while some of these conclusions might be true, they are not and cannot 
be rationally demonstrated. However, the three most serious errors, he claims, are: (1) 
The claim that the world is eternal; (2) The claim that God only knows universals, and 
not particulars; (3) The denial of bodily resurrection. Al-Ghazālī argues that none of these 
claims are rationally demonstrated; instead, they are internally inconsistent, and also in 
conflict with revelation.  
In the munqidh, al-Ghazālī only briefly summarizes and references the more 
thorough and systematic critique of metaphysics that he gives in the tahafut, for he is 
after a more general set of conclusions about reason.  
Whereas Descartes’ Meditations serve as a reductio ad absurdum of skepticism 
by showing how the grounds for skepticism are internally inconsistent, al-Ghazālī’s 
reductio is precisely aimed at showing the internal inconsistency of reason, at least 
insofar as reason generates metaphysical questions and reaches for impossible answers to 
them. We should not say he is a skeptic, however, for he does rehabilitate reason in a 
different way.  
As we saw in the mishkāt, al-Ghazālī does have a high opinion of the rational 
faculty indeed. For him, the rational faculty shares in the World of Dominion. After 
going through his overall critique of philosophy, he has the following to say, which 
should assuage any concerns about al-Ghazālī rejecting philosophy as such: 
 
“However, assuming that [ideas, arguments or claims to truth] are found only in 
the writings of the philosophers, if what is said is reasonable in itself and corroborated by 
apodeictic proof and not contrary to the Qur’an and the Sunna, then why should it be 
shunned and rejected? If we were to open this door and aim at forgoing every truth which 
had been first formulated by the mind of one in error, we would have to forgo much of 
what is true. We would also have to give up a lot of the verses of the Qur’an and the 
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traditions of the Apostle and the recitals of our pious forebears and the sayings of the 
sages and the Sufis.”120 
 
 
While al-Ghazālī thinks metaphysics is outside the reach of reason, he also thinks 
one can come to know truths transcendent to reason by means of mystic insight. Just as 
Kant attempts to rescue the content of metaphysics by reorienting our quest for it towards 
morality and freedom, so too does al-Ghazālī attempt to reorient us towards mysticism121 
in our quest for metaphysical knowledge.  
This mystical knowledge is non-discursive, non-linguistic, and indemonstrable. It 
can only be known by fruitional experience [dhawq]. 122  What is this fruitional 
experience? More importantly, how can al-Ghazālī argue for such a kind of knowledge, 
except by personal testimony, without incurring charges of obscurantism? 
There are some possible answers to this question. Firstly, while al-Ghazālī does 
not think mystic insight can be rationally demonstrated, he does think that the possibility 
of mystic insight can, indeed, be demonstrated. Here al-Ghazālī once again invokes 
dreams to make his argument –– this time in a positive light –– as well as prophecy.  
Let us look at prophecy first. Understanding al-Ghazālī’s view of prophecy 
requires a quick gloss of Ibn Sina’s view, which al-Ghazālī incorporates and amends.  Ibn 
Sina thought that prophets have the ability to intuit complex, deep rational truths and, by 
the power of the imagination, express them in symbols for the benefit of those lacking 
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121 The general definition of mysticism I am operating under is: knowledge or longing of knowledge 
(primarily of God) by means of supra-rational faculties. 
122 Literally translates to “tasting.” 
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this capability. Al-Ghazālī adopts Ibn Sina’s psychological structure,123 but refuses to 
accept that prophecy is necessarily rational. In response to Ibn Sina’s more “naturalized” 
account of prophecy, al-Ghazālī has the following to say: 
 
“He who pays lip service to the existence of prophecy, but equates the 
prescriptions of revelation with human wisdom, really disbelieves in prophecy. He 
believes only in a sage with a special star of destiny whose ascendancy demands that he 
be followed. This has nothing at all to do with prophecy. On the contrary, faith in 
prophecy is to acknowledge the affirmation of a stage beyond reason: in it an eye is 
opened by which a special perception of certain perceptibles is had; from the perception 
of these reason is excluded, just as hearing is from the perception of colors, and sight 
from the perception of sounds, and all the senses from the perception of intelligibles.” 124 
 
 The content of prophetic knowledge, for al-Ghazālī, is better understood as 
“divine inspiration” (ilham). 125  All human beings are endowed with the same 
psychological features (i.e. the prophetic faculty, the rational faculty, etc.), but for most 
people these faculties are extremely weak and incapable of accessing higher-grade 
reality.  
Al-Ghazālī suggests that evidence of prophecy can be found by appeal to the 
empirical sciences. He suggests that there is knowledge in medicine and astronomy that 
could not possibly have been achieved by simple empirical or rational undertakings. It is 
unclear which specific examples he has in mind, or specific miraculous predictions by 
prophets he may be thinking of, but generally I think he is referring either to: (1) ‘eureka 
moments,’ which may be instances of divine inspiration (ilham), or (2) miraculous 
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predictions or discoveries made by prophets or Sufi masters in the sciences (he does not 
provide examples). 
With regards to dreams, al-Ghazālī argues that they provide evidence for the 
possibility of the mystic faculty. As we saw when considering his skeptical phase, he 
thinks dreams are not rational. Yet, he thinks we can nonetheless acquire valid 
knowledge from our experiences in dreams. He thinks dreams disclose information to us. 
Whereas some dreams are simply absurdities (like the kind discussed in the skeptical 
phase), others contain divinely inspired (ilham) truths. One way to put this might be that 
some lower-grade dreams are irrational, whereas divinely inspired dreams are non-
rational representations of truth.  
 While al-Ghazālī has premonitions and other esoteric, non-rational knowledge in 
mind, I propose to also consider his meaning philosophically. I think what al-Ghazālī at 
least implies is: even though dream consciousness is non-rational, dream experience may 
nonetheless contain information that can be conceptualized rationally. This is why, after 
awaking from a dream and returning to waking consciousness, we may mine our dreams 
for information. To give some mundane examples, consider composers who dream of 
perfectly new musical compositions, which, when recalled from waking consciousness, 
can be expressed in musical notation or played on an instrument. Consider, also, 
scientific and philosophical breakthroughs that might come to us while dreaming.  
I think al-Ghazālī has grander ideas in mind for what can be disclosed in a dream, 
but the basis of his psychology here is phenomenological. Essences –– which, like 
Descartes, he thinks can be intuited by intellectual perception –– persist in dreams. They 
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can be configured in a number of ways by dream consciousness; then, once we awake, 
those configurations, which were not intelligible to dream consciousness due to the 
defective powers of reason in that state, become intelligible to waking consciousness. It is 
not the substance of the dream that changes, but rather the state of consciousness 
attending to it. Al-Ghazālī concludes that this weak form of ilham, which serves as a 
“fraction” of the content of prophecy, is accessible to everyone and thereby serves as 
evidence for the possibility of the supra-rational. 
The analogies al-Ghazālī uses to explain his position appeals to what we would 
today call qualia; or the subjective, phenomenological characteristics of conscious 
experiences. He says: 
 
“How great a difference there is between your knowing the definitions and 
causes and conditions of health and satiety and your being healthy and sated! And how 
great a difference there is between your knowing the definition of drunkenness…and 
your actually being drunk! Indeed, a drunken man, while he is drunk, does not know the 
definition and the concept of drunkenness and has no knowledge of it. But a physician 
knows the definition and elements of drunkenness, though he is experiencing no actual 
drunkenness. So also, when a physician is ill, he knows the definition and causes of 
health and the remedies which procure it, though he is then actually bereft of health. 
Similarly, too, there is a difference between knowing the true nature and conditions and 
causes of asceticism and personally shunning the things of this world.”126  
 
 
Another example might regard colours. One can explain to a person who was born 
blind what seeing colours is like, but the blind person shall have no recourse whatsoever 
to understanding what seeing colours is like without having actual sight. Al-Ghazālī thus 
claims that the knowledge characteristic of Sufism cannot be learned by theory, but must 
be experienced for oneself. While dhawq as a mode of knowing thus contains mundane 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 RJM, 52 
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phenomenological, subjectively exclusive knowledge such as the understanding of what 
seeing colours is like, for al-Ghazālī it also contains esoteric, mystical knowledge of the 
Divine. We should be careful to note that dhawq contains these two kinds of knowledge, 
which are similar in that they are subjectively exclusive and cannot be known by theory 
or analysis, but not entirely commensurable in terms of their other qualities (particularly 
such that one is mundane and the other is divine, if we can permit such a crude 
distinction). We should also note that the pursuit of this knowledge has a strongly moral 
character, as might be gleaned from his remark about asceticism.  
Furthermore, al-Ghazālī does not think this kind of experience (mystic insight) is 
at the same level as sense-experience. Rather, he thinks it is above reason insofar as it has 
higher light for its content, as we saw in the mishkāt, and insofar as it improves one’s 
moral and spiritual character. After the spiritual crisis that led him to depart from his 
prestigious post in Baghdad, al-Ghazālī spent years living among the Sufis and pursuing 
just this kind of mystic knowledge. He further insists127 that anyone who achieves such 
insight should not try to describe the experience, for any such utterance would be corrupt 
and only serve to confuse others.128  
What we can safely conclude is that al-Ghazālī’s goal is not, in fact, to reject 
philosophy wholesale or to reject it at all. Rather, it is to (1) rationally demonstrate the 
limits of reason (in the tahafut) and then (2) to appeal to the supra-rational as a way to 
access the reality which reason cannot grasp. In other words, he wants to rehabilitate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 RJM, 57 
128 Al-Ghazālī cautions against describing mystic experience for philosophical reasons – because it is 
ineffable in principle – but also for practical reasons. He no doubt has al-Hallaj (c. 858 – 922) in mind in 
issuing this warning. Al-Hallaj, who, in his state of mystic ecstasy, exclaimed, “I am the Truth [al-haqq]!” 
and was later executed for it. 
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philosophy by discerning the limits of reason, and its correct relation to the other faculties 
of the mind. Having clarified what his true attitude towards philosophy is, and his remedy 
to the failure of metaphysics, it remains for us to consider what the relationship between 
reason and revelation (more specifically, the supra-rational) is. 
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11.2. Descartes’ Rejection of Aristotelian Metaphysics 
 
Descartes does not dismiss the possibility of rational metaphysics as al-Ghazālī 
does (Descartes’ Meditations are on first philosophy, after all). He does, however, further 
the process of dethroning metaphysics as the queen of the sciences – a move that shall 
characterize many subsequent centuries of philosophy. The way in which Descartes does 
this is not entirely dissimilar to al-Ghazālī. To be sure, Descartes does not come close to 
mysticism, though he does suggest that reason cannot grasp all of metaphysical reality. 
This is a limitation on the powers of reason, especially in contrast to the Aristotelian and 
Platonic traditions.  
 There are three chief components of Descartes’ epistemological limiting of 
reason: (1) The removal of final causes; (2) The theory of occasionalist causation; (3) The 
general insistence on the finiteness of the human intellect and knowledge, in contrast to 
God’s infinite intellect and knowledge. 
With regards to final causes, Descartes has the following to say in the Fourth 
Meditation: 
    
“[I]t occurs to me first of all that it is no cause for surprise if I do not understand 
the reasons for some of God’s actions; and there is no call to doubt his existence if I 
happen to find that there are other instances where I do not grasp why or how certain 
things were made by him. For since I now know that my own nature is very weak and 
limited, whereas the nature of God is immense, incomprehensible and infinite, I also 
know without more ado that he is capable of countless things whose causes are beyond 
my knowledge. And for this reason alone I consider the customary search for final causes 
to be totally useless in physics; there is considerable rashness in thinking myself capable 
of investigating the impenetrable purposes of God”129 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 CSM II, 38-39. The sense of this paragraph is even more clear in the French translation (Méditations 
Metaphysique, 4: 139-141). 
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In this passage, Descartes is suggesting that there are in fact final causes, but that 
only God knows them (or can know them). Human beings, armed only with an imperfect 
rational faculty, cannot hope to know what God’s purposes are. Descartes also goes to 
some lengths in the Fourth Meditation (and beyond) to contrast the finiteness of the 
human intellect with the infinite intellect of God.130  
The crucial paragraph in which many of Descartes’s anti-Aristotelian claims are 
demonstrated can be found in the Principles of Philosophy. In fact, Descartes’ claims in 
Part 28 of the Principles are remarkably close to al-Ghazālī in various respects. He says: 
 
“When dealing with natural things we will, then, never derive any explanations 
from the purposes which God or nature may have had in view when creating them <and 
we shall entirely banish from our philosophy the search for final causes>. For we should 
not be so arrogant as to suppose that we can share in God’s plans. We should, instead, 
consider him as the efficient cause of all things; starting from the divine attributes which 
by God’s will we have some knowledge of, we shall see, with the aid of our God-given 
natural light, what conclusions should be drawn concerning those effects which are 
apparent to our senses. At the same time we should remember…that the natural light is to 
be trusted only to the extent that it is compatible with divine revelation.”131 
 
 
Curiously, Descartes’ use of the “natural light,” here, seems to run against the 
claim I made earlier (that he uses it merely a metaphor for clearness and distinctness). In 
this paragraph, it seems the natural light is the rational faculty itself – a view that is quite 
compatible with al-Ghazālī’s view, even if it does not imply anything further. Descartes’ 
last claim in the above passage, that clarity and distinctness can be voided if it conflicts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 CSM II, 42. 
131 CSM I, 202-203.  
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with revelation, also coheres greatly with al-Ghazālī (as we shall see in greater detail 
shortly). 
Furthermore, in Paragraph 21 of the Principles, 132 Descartes suggests that since 
human existence persists across time, there must be a force to sustain it, or “keep it in 
existence.” This is a variation on his proof for the existence of God in the Third 
Meditation. These passages serve as the basis for Descartes’ occasionalism. Along with 
his first proof for the existence of God in the Third Meditation,133 we can glean the 
following about Descartes’ occasionalism:134 
 
(1) All existence is contingent upon God, the necessary existent. 
(2) God constantly sustains all existence. 
(3) The reality of God pervades all existent objects. 
(4) God controls causality over and above the world. We might say God 
constantly “intervenes.” 
(5) Since the ‘regular conjunction’ of causes and their effects is a result of God’s 
habits rather than any real necessity between them, miracles are possible.  
(6) God’s purposes are outside of our knowledge. 
 
 
Therefore, not only is God transcendent for Descartes, but so is a significant 
degree of metaphysical reality, too.  
As far as comparisons to al-Ghazālī go, this doctrine of occasionalism is very 
similar. Al-Ghazālī’s own argument for occasionalism, in anticipation of Hume, further 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 CSM I, 200. 
133 CSM II, 28, esp. with regards to there being “as much reality” in the total and efficient cause as in the 
effect. 
134 Tad Schmaltz, in Descartes on Causation, has argued that Descartes’ occasionalism (and, more 
generally, his break from scholasticism) is not as cleanly defined as we might expect. Schmaltz makes a 
very compelling case, but, for brevity’s sake, I shall not address the intricacies of Cartesian occasionalism 
prompted by Schmaltz’ views in this paper. 
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insists on the lack of necessity between causes and their effects.135 Al-Ghazālī also held 
the view that objects have no inherent properties, since their properties or qualities are 
exemplified solely as a result of God’s actions.136 137 
The limits of reason, for Descartes, further include instances of knowing whether 
we perceive something perfectly clearly and distinctly. As Descartes suggests across the 
whole of the Meditations, clarity and distinctness comes in degrees.138 Whether or not we 
have complete evidence, or complete clarity and distinctness of a perception, is known 
only to God.139  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 IP, 166-177.  
136 In Causality Then and Now: al-Ghazālī and Quantum Theory, Karen Harding has argued that al-
Ghazālī’s occasionalism bears some significant similarities to the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum 
Mechanics, for what it is worth. Her claim is that on both theories: (1) objects have no inherent properties, 
(2) objects have no independent existence, and (3) objects require either an observer or God, depending on 
the theory, to exist. 
137 Frank Griffel has argued that part of the dispute is due to different assumptions about necessity between 
Ibn Sina and al-Ghazālī. According to Griffel, Ibn Sina follows a more traditional Aristotelian 
understanding of modal necessity, and al-Ghazālī follows the Ash’arite notion of necessity, which involves 
conceivability as opposed to the strict modality of our own world. 
138 DDM, 191 
139 DDM, 196 
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11.3. Descartes’ and al-Ghazālī’s New Metaphysics 
 
Having established how both thinkers modify and limit reason and metaphysics 
after their skeptical phases – generally, by overthrowing much of the Aristotelian 
tradition – we shall now briefly consider what positive metaphysical claims they make. 
This section is not intended to treat all of these topics exhaustively, but simply to give a 
brief outline of how their claims compare. 
 
 Descartes’ rejection of Aristotelian metaphysics still preserves much of reason’s 
powers, and those powers are perhaps compensated by the doctrine of Innatism and 
substance dualism he simultaneously develops. On al-Ghazālī’s view of reason, 
meanwhile, metaphysics shall have a much harder time fitting in with the rest of 
philosophy. Let us now compare each thinker’s positive claim against the other, where 
appropriate. 
We have already seen that Descartes’ view of causation and al-Ghazālī’s view of 
causation are generally very similar, if not identical, though they no doubt differ in their 
particulars, which I shall not address here.  
Descartes’ theory of abstract intellection, as best exemplified by the wax 
argument of the Second Meditation, bears some similarities to al-Ghazālī’s theory of 
intellection. As we noted when considering the mishkāt, al-Ghazālī says that the rational 
faculty, once it “disengages” from the world of matter, “sees things as they are in 
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themselves.”140 Furthermore, al-Ghazālī distinguishes between the Rational Spirit and the 
Reflective Spirit. The Rational Spirit is able to apprehend universal necessities all at 
once, non-discursively. Descartes’ theory of intuition is identical with al-Ghazālī’s in this 
case, though the exact divisions of the soul likely do not mirror each other for both 
thinkers. 
We might wonder now about the reality of universals for both thinkers. Proof Ten 
of the Eighteenth Discussion of the tahafut exhibits al-Ghazālī giving what seems like a 
nominalist critique of universal realism.141 However, it is unclear if that is in fact his 
position, for, as we noted, the arguments in the tahafut are intended to demonstrate the 
failures of “the philosophers,” without necessarily putting forth alternatives.  
Al-Ghazālī’s claim in the mishkāt that the rational faculty apprehends “universal, 
self-evident knowledge” should at least make one wary about hastily labeling him a 
nominalist. Furthermore, both Descartes’ and al-Ghazālī’s theories of abstraction indicate 
that they think there are underlying essences exemplified in matter, which the intellect 
apprehends as universals. 
Certainly, universals shall not be eternal for either Descartes or al-Ghazālī in the 
way that Plato or other realists might consider them to be. Since everything is utterly 
contingent upon God, universals, too, shall be contingent. On the strong occasionalist 
reading of both, it also means that any exemplified properties do not belong to their 
objects. However, this does not say anything about their reality as such. Furthermore, this 
view may not be attributable to Descartes, for lack of evidence. What we can say with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140NL, 10. 
141IP, 198-199 
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more confidence about Descartes’s view is that properties are at the very least dependent 
on substance (as opposed to the natures of particular objects), and thereby indirectly 
dependent upon God. 
With regards to substances, Descartes’ position is undoubtedly clear: aside from 
God, the uncreated substance, there are two substances – mind (res cogitans) and 
extension (res extensa) – and they are irreducible to each other. This is a clear departure 
from Aristotle’s claim that the mind and body are “distinguishable but not separable.”142 
Just as al-Ghazālī argues his occasionalism from conceivability, so too does Descartes 
use this ‘proto possible world logic’ to argue for the irreducibility of mind and body from 
each other. This view of the logic of possibility and necessity, which al-Ghazālī and 
Descartes both share, further runs against the Aristotelian view, which only considers 
what is possible in our history. 
Al-Ghazālī’s view is more ambiguous, especially given his arguments against the 
strong soul-body dualism of “the philosophers” in Discussions Eighteen and Twenty of 
the tahafut. Ibn Sina and al-Farabi held the view that only people’s souls live on after 
death, while the body does not, and shall not be resurrected. Such a view suggests a kind 
of irreducibility of soul and body. Al-Ghazālī argues that they fail to demonstrate these 
claims. He further argues that denying bodily resurrection conflicts with revelation. 
Once again, however, his rejection of their arguments should not necessarily be 
taken as indication of his full view. Perhaps the strongest indication of al-Ghazālī holding 
a kind of dualist view or inclination (it shall in any case be a peculiar kind of dualism, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Aristotle, De Anima, 414a20ff 
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a dualism that does not fully sever the link to the body, since he seems keen to want to 
preserve the resurrection of the body) is in the mishkāt, where he says: 
 
“Know that the cosmos is two worlds: spiritual and bodily. If you want, you can 
say ‘sensory and rational,’ or ‘high and low.’ All these words are close in meaning. They 
differ only through different viewpoints. Hence, when you view the two worlds in 
themselves, you will say ‘bodily and spiritual.’ When you view them in relation to the 
eye that perceives them, you will say ‘sensory and rational.’ When you view them in 
relation to one another, you will say ‘high and low.’ It may happen that you name one of 
these worlds ‘the world of the kingdom and the visible,’ while the other is the ‘unseen 
world and the dominion.’”143 
 
 
While the claims in this passage do resemble Descartes’ substance dualism, it is 
worth noting the Sufi characteristics of al-Ghazālī’s account. Recall the way al-Ghazālī 
discards the subject-object distinction when describing the hierarchy of lights. The 
passage here above suggests that minds are not the only kinds of spiritual substance, 
though some non-mind spiritual objects might additionally be rational. 
With regards to how the sensory/material world and the spiritual/mental world 
interact, al-Ghazālī and Descartes have similar views once again. We have already 
considered their similar theories of abstraction. As for perception, both seem to link the 
faculty of the imagination to memory, such that memory retains the forms of sensations, 
and then feeds them to the imagination.144 The imagination thus bridges the sensory 
faculties to the rational faculties.   
 Descartes’ theory of perception, which includes the interaction of mind and 
matter, seems representationalist. Though al-Ghazālī does not elaborate on any such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 NL, 25. 
144 CSM II, 51 for Descartes; NL, 36 for al-Ghazālī. 
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views in the works here considered, a case could be made that such a view is implied by 
his overall views on perception and the faculties of the soul. 
 Another point of comparison regards the correspondence of truth and reality. 
Let us now recall al-Ghazālī’s World of Dominion, and the hierarchy of possible 
knowledge which corresponds to it, which I outlined in Section 7. Note, further, that the 
World of Dominion represents absolute reality in degrees. Here below is each thinker’s 
metaphysical view of the spiritual/intellectual world (excluding the world of matter), in 
relation to what each section of it corresponds to: 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: al-Ghazālī’s New Metaphysical Reality Figure 3.2: Descartes’ New Metaphysical Reality 
 
 
What is remarkable here is that al-Ghazālī preserves the general distinction 
between global and local states of illusion, which he drew in his skeptical phase. Since he 
rejects skepticism, however, the global and local states are no longer illusive; rather, they 
1.	  God's	  Knowledge	  (InKinite	  –	  Transcendent	  to	  the	  WoD)	  
2.	  Prophecy	  
3.	  Mystic	  Insight	  
4.	  Reason	  
A.	  God's	  Knowledge	  (InKinite)	  
B.	  Reason	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are layers of absolute reality, which are hierarchically transcendent to each other. For 
Descartes, the only realm over and above what is rationally intelligible is that of God. 
 Al-Ghazālī’s scheme, here, illuminates the trajectory of his thought as a 
consequence of skepticism, which I shall say more about in the next section.  
We might ask, however: Are (2), (3) and (4) in Figure 4.1 commensurable to (B) 
in Figure 4.2? In other words, are al-Ghazālī and Descartes talking past each other, such 
that Descartes has an expansive view of reason that captures what al-Ghazālī does not 
include in reason? I think the answer is clearly not.  
While Descartes certainly includes phenomenological knowledge as part of 
reason, per the very way out of skepticism he provides, there is no evidence to suggest 
that such knowledge would extend to esoteric, incommunicable knowledge of the Divine.  
To briefly consider how we might approach this question, however, it might be 
worth looking at Ibn Sina’s conception of reason. 
One could perhaps make the argument – to a certain extent – that the scope of 
reason for Ibn Sina extends to what al-Ghazālī regards as the mystic realm. Ibn Sina says, 
“Reasoning is the tongue of angels, who have no speech or utterance; reasoning belongs 
to them especially, which is perception without sensing and communication without 
words.”145 This is a clear departure from Aristotle, who infers our general ability to 
reason from the fact that we have speech.146 Of course, Ibn Sina wants to preserve the 
Aristotelian hierarchy within the soul, where rationality takes priority, while also 
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146 Aristotle, Politics, 1253a1-18 
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appealing to an idealized, perfect, non-linguistic, non-discursive notion of reason. For Ibn 
Sina, it is just that the meaning of rationality is modified and expanded to accommodate 
what we would otherwise call the supra-rational. 
Considering that Descartes repeatedly tells us that our rational faculty is imperfect 
in comparison to God (and, presumably, the angels as well), it might be worth 
considering how close his conception of reason is to Ibn Sina – and, therefore, how we 
might adjust our comparison to al-Ghazālī. I am not sure there is sufficient evidence in 
Descartes to warrant such an argument, but it is worth contemplating nonetheless. 
Lastly, let us consider the role of language in their new metaphysics. There seem 
to be two crucial questions about language and reason in this context: (1) Must reason be 
linguistic? (2) Can a person have a rational (or supra-rational) thought that is, in 
principle, ineffable? Logical positivists, for instance, would affirm (1) and deny (2). On a 
certain reading, Aristotle, too, might deny (2). Ibn Sina, by contrast, suggests that 
language is a hindrance to the pure form of reason. He thinks that reason at its best is not 
linguistic, but a kind of instantaneous, intuitive understanding of a vastly complex whole 
(which, on his view, prophets are capable of). 
As we have already seen, al-Ghazālī thinks there is knowledge that is 
inexpressible in principle. He further tells us in the mishkāt that, “[O]ne to whom the 
realities are unveiled will make meaning a root and the words a follower. This situation is 
reversed in the weak, since they search for the realities from the words.”147 That is not a 
claim that would make any logical positivists happy (and may therefore shed further light 
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on the question of how al-Ghazālī viewed universals). From these claims we can gather 
the following: (1) The supra-rational is non-linguistic in principle; (2) Even strictly 
rational thoughts begin non-linguistically, and can hold non-linguistically. 
Descartes’s view is a bit more ambiguous. However, he does tell us in Part Five 
of the Discourse that machines and animals exhibit their lack of rationality in virtue of 
their lack of language.148 While this is not enough to suggest that Descartes thinks all 
rational thought must, in principle, be expressible in language, it certainly strengthens the 
link between reason and language.  
 
 
What we have shown in this section is that al-Ghazālī’s new metaphysics 
preserves the content of metaphysics, but insists on an epistemological limitation in 
rationally acquiring it. Descartes, too, imposes a lesser epistemological limitation on 
metaphysical reality. Both thinkers flirt with a weak kind of nominalism, in virtue of their 
occasionalism. Descartes’ substance dualism is mirrored at least thematically in al-
Ghazālī, even if all the details are not identical. 
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12. Reconciling Reason, Revelation and Skepticism 
 
In the previous sections, we clarified that al-Ghazālī rejects most of rational 
metaphysics. We also clarified that he insists on the faculty of mystic insight and its 
corresponding reality as being superior to reason. It remains for us to see how reason and 
the supra-rational can be reconciled on al-Ghazālī’s own terms. Afterwards, we shall 
more generally consider how al-Ghazālī and Descartes arrived at their differences, 
despite such similar beginnings. 
 
Some interpreters, such as Massimo Campanini,149 have argued that al-Ghazālī 
thinks religion and philosophy are completely and essentially irreducible to each other. 
One way to translate this claim is that revelation is non-rational; or, on an even stronger 
interpretation, revelation cannot be rationally understood. While this is not an implausible 
reading of al-Ghazālī, it misses the subtlety of his actual view. Furthermore, it may 
commit al-Ghazālī to extremely obvious contradictions, which someone of his intellect 
would no doubt have recognized. I propose to take al-Ghazālī on his own terms.  
One need only look at the language and conceptual work of the mishkāt to see that 
al-Ghazālī had no problem making use of Neoplatonic and Aristotelian concepts in his 
own thought and Qur’anic hermeneutics, some of which blur the lines of religion and 
philosophy into convergence –– at least at their very fringes. Indeed, it is this very 
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(selective) use of philosophical concepts that incurs charges of contradiction from Ibn 
Rushd.150 Let us test Ibn Rushd’s criticism on al-Ghazālī’s own terms. 
Aside from the more baroque discussions of existence, emanation, contingency, 
modal necessity, and Qur’anic interpretation in the mishkāt, there are other, more 
immediate examples available in the munqidh that might fit Ibn Rushd’s criticism. Let us 
consider these and see if we can make sense of them. 
After asserting the merits of Sufism, al-Ghazālī presents us with a demonstrative 
proof for the possibility and existence of prophecy.151 One might immediately be baffled 
as to why al-Ghazālī would attempt to give us a rational demonstration regarding what 
seems like a clearly metaphysical question, right after having insisted on the failures of 
rational metaphysics. Furthermore, al-Ghazālī’s occasionalist doctrine is rationally 
demonstrated in the tahafut. Indeed, few if any of his arguments hinge on mystic insight. 
Clearly, al-Ghazālī has no problem, therefore, with using reason to answer some 
metaphysical questions.  
We may also gather some vital information from al-Ghazālī’s Qur’anic 
hermeneutics. Al-Ghazālī’s method of interpreting revelation is grounded on strongly 
rational principles.152 I shall generally sketch these principles as follows: (1) Read the 
meaning of the text literally, unless a literal reading can be rationally demonstrated to be 
inconsistent; (2) If it can be rationally demonstrated that no literal reading of the text is 
possible, then interpret according to possible symbolic, metaphorical or mystical 
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meanings. For example, it can be rationally demonstrated that God cannot have literal 
“hands” or “sit on a throne.”153 The text regarding such references must therefore be 
interpreted symbolically.  
What I propose, now, is that we take a modus tollens approach to understanding 
al-Ghazālī’s use of reason. My argument shall be as follows: If al-Ghazālī thinks that 
reason and revelation are heterogeneous, then he shall not use reason to try and answer 
metaphysical or religious questions; but since al-Ghazālī does use reason to answer these 
questions, he therefore does not think that reason and revelation are absolutely 
heterogeneous. His use of reason in metaphysics, particularly, does not suggest that he is 
contradicting himself; rather, it suggests that he is far more concerned with the misuse 
and overestimation of reason than the use of reason as such to apprehend metaphysical 
truth.  
His general scheme seems to be as follows: (1) Use reason to apprehend a truth, 
unless it can be rationally shown that reason cannot access that truth; (2) If a claim is, in 
fact, rationally demonstrated, then it is self-evidently within the scope of reason; (3) 
Where reason fails, as in much of metaphysics, the dedicated mystic nonetheless has 
access to that reality by way of mystic insight, and the average believer has access to it by 
way of revelation.  
Note that Descartes makes a similar claim regarding the relation of reason to 
revelation, in which reason cannot override revelation, though it is essential to 
interpreting revelation. Descartes says, “At the same time we should remember…that the 
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natural light is to be trusted only to the extent that it is compatible with divine 
revelation.”154 
With regards to the coherence of fruitional experience [dhawq] and reason, al-
Ghazālī says the following in the munqidh: 
 
“Ascertainment by apodeictic proof leads to knowledge. Intimate experience of 
that very state is fruitional experience. Favorable acceptance of it based on hearsay and 
experience of others is faith. These, then, are three degrees, or levels, of knowledge – 
‘God raises in degrees those of you who believe and those to whom knowledge is given.’ 
(58.12/11).”155 
 
There are also more nuanced and sophisticated ways in which al-Ghazālī attempts 
this coherence of reason and revelation. Scott Girdner identifies a number of passages 
where al-Ghazālī alternates between philosophical and mystical concepts. One example 
involves a section of the mishkāt entitled “the reality of Realities,”156 where al-Ghazālī 
gives an unfinished version of Ibn Sina’s ontological argument, a logical argument, and 
symbolic interpretive allusions, all at once while interpreting a passage of the Qur’an (al-
Qasas; 28:88). 
Whereas the superficial purpose of the text is to interpret al-Qasas in terms of the 
hierarchy of lights and the contingency of all existence upon God, the subtext aims at the 
multifarious modes of knowing this truth.157 With regards to this passage, Girdner writes, 
“[al-Ghazālī’s] purpose seems to be to accomplish an integration of philosophy and 
mysticism by means of the authoritative witness of Qur’anic proof texts. He does this 
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largely by locating both philosophical and mystical concepts in the same passage of the 
Qur’an, then using it to equate the concepts.”158 
 While al-Ghazālī does not think the mystic and rational realms are completely 
reducible to each other, there is very good reason to think they converge at their fringes. 
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13. Conclusion: Inverting the Shadow Structures of Skepticism 
 
Now that we have explored the comparative trajectories of Descartes’ and al-
Ghazālī’s post-skeptical philosophies, it remains to ask: why? Why, after arriving at 
seemingly identical skeptical conclusions, do they end up in such different places in their 
attempts to defeat skepticism? While there are a great many similarities between them, 
the general disparity between their views on reason, especially, seems irreconcilable. 
I have proposed that while the formal conclusions of their skeptical phases were 
identical, their substantive content was not. Now I shall argue why it is in view of these 
substantive differences that much of the resulting philosophical work differs. Then, I 
shall draw a more general, synthetic conclusion about skepticism itself. 
 
Descartes’ strongest reason to doubt, the evil demon, is posited only as a 
possibility. Since Descartes is after necessarily certain knowledge, his task primarily 
involves defeating this possibility. For al-Ghazālī, however, the strongest reason to doubt 
is not a possibility, it is a necessary and lived reality: dreaming. Al-Ghazālī cannot argue 
that dreams are not possible, and he must therefore explain why dreaming (as he sets it 
up) does not entail global skepticism. Dreams are actual, and for al-Ghazālī their power 
to undermine reason must therefore be defeated by appeal to an actual authority 
transcendent to reason.  
Immediately, we can see how their tasks are different. Descartes’ task involves 
disproving the possibility of a hypothetical; al-Ghazālī’s involves disproving the seeming 
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logical consequent of an unavoidable reality. Both begin their tasks by latching on to the 
phenomenology of being (which, it seems, is the most serious and immediate opponent to 
global skepticism), but subsequently diverge. Al-Ghazālī cannot complete the Cartesian 
Loop precisely because reason cannot sufficiently secure itself. 
Now, I argue, both Descartes and al-Ghazālī make use of the conclusions they 
arrived at during their skeptical phases, whether by necessity or convenience, to 
guarantee certain knowledge. More specifically, the formal structures of reality generated 
by their skeptical arguments persists even after the defeat of skepticism. In order to 
clarify my position, let us consider again the visual representations of their skeptical 
conceptions of reality, and then contrast them to that of their post-skeptical phases. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: al-Ghazālī’s Skeptical Reality à Figure 4.2: al-Ghazālī’s Certain Reality159 
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Figure 5.1 Descartes’ Skeptical Reality   à Figure 5.2: Descartes’ Certain Reality 
 
 
 
In the post-skeptical phase, both thinkers negate the content of the formal 
structures they were confronted with in the skeptical phase, and then invert the space for 
that content with positives.  
The structure of reality generated by Descartes’ doubt has three layers: the two 
local states of self-illusive consciousness and the reality that is illusive to each, and the 
global state occupied by the evil demon. In his positive phase, we have the local states of 
perceptual and rational consciousness and the reality they access, and the global state of 
absolute reality known only to God (wherein final causes and the awareness of perfect 
evidence resides). 
In al-Ghazālī, meanwhile, the possibility of transcendent states never really goes 
away. Autobiographically, this accounts for why his was a genuine personal crisis, and 
not merely a way to affirm something he already believed. The conclusions he came to 
during his skeptical phase confronted him with the possibility of transcendent reality, 
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which denies local states of consciousness the possibility of immanently securing 
themselves or their knowledge.  
More concretely, al-Ghazālī concluded that: (1) Dream consciousness cannot 
know itself; (2) We know waking/rational consciousness and the reality it accesses exist 
over and above dream consciousness, denying it the tools or warrant to make itself 
certain; (3) Rational consciousness cannot know itself because (1) and (2) suggest it is 
possible for there to be n number of transcendent states over and above it and each other. 
Instead of trying to deny that this structure exists in actuality, al-Ghazālī instead 
works to show that this structure, as a whole, really contains positive content. He does not 
deny that there are transcendent states of consciousness; instead, he works to show why 
the existence of these transcendent states does not entail global skepticism. It is then in 
virtue of the coherence of each layer of the structure that this positive content (rational 
consciousness, mystic insight, etc.) is secured. Thus, for al-Ghazālī, reason is primitively 
secured insofar as reason can know itself, even though a true understanding of why it is 
secure is available to the mystic; meanwhile, the supra-rational, the prophetic and the 
divine are secure since reason can recognize them and its subordinate place in relation to 
them. More specifically, the ability to know in virtue of being, along with the possibility 
of having mystic insight and knowledge of God, derivatively provides al-Ghazālī the 
means to authenticate reason. Al-Ghazālī therefore remains a skeptic about the 
sufficiency of reason to immanently secure itself, though he finds a way to avoid being a 
skeptic about reason itself.  
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To reiterate: on al-Ghazālī’s view, all rational beliefs are formally160 secured by 
the coherence of reason and the supra-rational. Practically, al-Ghazālī thinks that even if 
we do not have access to the realm of mystic knowledge, we nonetheless have good 
reason to believe that this realm exists.161 And furthermore, the sheer fact of being gives 
reason primitive access to rational knowledge. Of course, he also thinks the states of 
consciousness transcendent to reason and their corresponding realities are accessible in 
principle, through mystic practice. 
Descartes, meanwhile, also appeals to a transcendent state of reality to give his 
structure positive content –– that is, by appealing to God –– but for Descartes, all of this 
content is nonetheless rational. Instead of the guarantee of deception from the evil 
demon, we have its inversion: the guarantee of certainty from God, who is perfectly 
rational. Indeed, it is not enough for Descartes to merely kill the demon. The demon must 
be replaced by God. 
Furthermore, recall the argument I drew our attention to in Section 6, wherein 
Descartes entertains the possibility of a world without God in the First Meditation, 
between the dream argument and the demon argument. In such a reality, Descartes 
supposes, he might have been created by a series of mundane, defective causes. Now 
consider the causal maxim he establishes in the Third Meditation. When combined with 
the causal maxim, this intermediary argument amounts to the following: there would be 
as much reality in those defective causes as there are in Descartes, and that would 	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161 Whether or not this second claim appears begs the question (in a manner reminiscent of the Cartesian 
Circle) is an interesting one, but I shall not address it in this paper. 
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account for why he can be deceived (in the context of the First Meditation). Here, again, 
we see content that is eventually inverted in the Third Meditation. Descartes implicitly 
builds the possibility of the causal maxim into his skepticism, on the way to the evil 
demon. His skepticism thus contains within it the seeds of his first proof for the existence 
of God. 
If ever Descartes were to be accused of begging the question, it would have to be 
here and not in the rehabilitation of the rule of evidence. While I shall not consider this 
question further, it seems an argument could be made for quite a larger circle in 
Descartes’ thought, wherein such principles as the divine guarantee and the causal 
maxims are subtly assumed from the very beginning, or perhaps at least that they are 
seeded in such a way as to radically determine the trajectory of skepticism and its 
eventual defeat by inversion.  
At the very least, we can say Descartes’ rehabilitation of reason is more 
immanently grounded in reason itself, even if we might argue that the infinity and 
perfection of God’s knowledge and rational powers really ends up being a form of the 
supra-rational, too (as I have argued it does in Ibn Sina). Descartes, however, thinks he 
can afford to affirm the self-sufficiency of reason because the possibility of the demon is 
destroyed altogether. In other words, unlike al-Ghazālī, Descartes provides an argument 
for why we cannot instantiate the relation of subordination between states of 
consciousness when it comes to rational consciousness. For Descartes, reason 
immanently grounds itself, so further transcendent states over and above reason are not 
possible. 
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What we can learn from this comparative episode is that global skepticism is 
never purely negative in content. Furthermore, global skepticism is never even empty of 
content. Instead, such skeptical arguments always contain: (1) formal conceptions of the 
structure of reality, and (2) the inversions of possible content for those formal structures. 
The formal conceptions of the structure of reality (1), which both thinkers import from 
their skeptical phases, are implicitly positive even during the skeptical phase. Meanwhile, 
the content of those structures (2), such as the evil demon for Descartes or the infinite 
regress of transcendent states for al-Ghazālī, is negative during the skeptical phase, 
though it contains the potential for positive content, such that its negation shall 
necessarily spawn its opposite. Descartes and al-Ghazālī find ways to make use of (1) and 
to negate (2), with respect to the exact structure of their skepticisms.  
Any skepticism worth taking seriously needs to be arrived at by sophisticated 
argument, as evidenced by al-Ghazālī and Descartes projects, and that argument shall 
itself give content to skepticism. It is not enough that the world should be illusory; it must 
be illusory in a specific, characteristic way. Global skepticism is thus held together by an 
internal paradox: in order to be skepticism, it must explain how and why all knowledge is 
impossible, but this explanation shall already implicitly ruin its own prospects. In this 
way, global skepticism contains also the determinates of whatever argument shall (or 
can) arrive to destroy it. It is a shadow structure ready to be pulled out from the 
underworld, inverted as a brilliant edifice.  
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